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INTRODUCTION
Foreign investment in the United States has accelerated during the
1970's.1 One omission from this investment activity, however, has been
the maritime industries, especially the merchant marine. Yet the maritime
industries in general and the merchant marine in particular are capital
intensive. In addition, the merchant marine and ship construction in the
United States have been declining relative to other nations for some
time.' The absence of foreign investment, a significant source of funds, in
a declining industry gives cause for reflection.
Foreign investment could take, and in other circumstances has taken, a
variety of forms. In its most pristine form, foreign investment encompasses the branch operations of a foreign national or firm in the United
States. Foreign investment also includes indirect commercial activity
such as establishing domestic corporations, purchasing equity or debt
securities in existing American corporations, or becoming a partner in
domestic partnerships.' Most such forms of direct and indirect foreign
investment in the merchant marine are restricted by law.
I. It has been reported that by December 1974 foreign investment in the United States
totaled approximately $106.5 billion, exclusive of state and local bonds and short-term debt
instruments such as commercial paper and Treasury bills. Foreign investment during 1973
and 1974 increased at approximately three times its growth rate in the prior decade. Phillips,
Foreign Investment in the United States: The Defense Industry, 56 B.U.L. REv. 843, 844
(1976). In contrast, in prior decades foreign investment was almost exclusively discussed in
the context of United States investment in other nations. See, e.g., Javits, Comments by
Jacob K. Javits, in REPORT OF THE GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS TO STUDY THE IMPACT OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, reprintedin, THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTER-

NATIONAL RELATIONS 104, U.N. Doc. E/5500/Rev. i, ST/ESA/6 (1974).
2. See notes 120-22 infra and accompanying text.
3. For statistical purposes the government divides foreign investment into two
categories, direct and portfolio. Doing business as an alien in the United States or establishing a domestic subsidiary would be classified as foreign direct investment. On the other
hand, purchasing the debt securities of an existing domestic corporation (unless the alien
already owned a certain percentage of the stock of that corporation) would be classified as
foreign, portfolio investment. Whether the purchase of stock in an existing domestic corporation is classified as direct or portfolio investment depends upon the percentage of stock
held by the alien after the purchase: if 10% or more, the investment is classified as direct;
otherwise, it is termed portfolio. This classification system is intended to differentiate
between control and noncontrol situations. For a more extended discussion of this system
and the problems associated with it, see Phillips, supra note I, at 847-49.
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Section 27 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,1 commonly called the

Jones Act, restricts the transportation of cargo between two points in the
United States to vessels "built in and documented under the laws of the
United States and owned by . . .citizens of the United States. ' " Not
only may aliens not engage in the domestic cargo trade directly, but also

their investment in United States corporations involved in such trade is
sharply limited. The Jones Act refers to section 2 of the Shipping Act 6 for

the definition of corporate citizenship. 7 As applied to the domestic trade,
that definition requires that 75 percent of the corporation's stock be held
by United States citizens. 8 Thus section 27 of the Jones Act incorporates
the historical concept of cabotage-the practice of reserving the trade
along a nation's coastal and internal waters to vessels registered under the
flag of that nation. American law has extended the cabotage restrictions
to other areas as well. Section 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act require
administrative approval for the transfer of United States flag vessels or
4. 46 U.S.C. §§ 861-89 (1970).
5. Id. § 883 (Supp. V 1975). See notes 124-57 infra and accompanying text.
6. 46 U.S.C. § 802 (1970). Section 2, in its entirety, states:
(a) Within the meaning of this chapter no corporation, partnership, or association
shall be deemed a citizen of the United States unless the controlling interest therein is
owned by citizens of the United States, and, in the case of a corporation, unless its
president or other chief executive officer and the chairman of its board of directors
are citizens of the United States and unless no more of its directors than a minority of
the number necessary to constitute a quorum are noncitizens and the corporation
itself is organized under the laws of the United States or of a State, Territory,
District, or possession thereof, but in the case of a corporation, association, or
partnership operating any vessel in the coastwise trade the amount of interest required to be owned by citizens of the United States shall be 75 per centum.
(b) The controlling interest in a corporation shall not be deemed to be owned by
citizens of the United States (a) if the title to a majority of the stock thereof is not
vested in such citizens free from any trust or fiduciary obligation in favor of any
person not a citizen of the United States; or (b)if the majority of the voting power in
such corporation is not vested in citizens of the United States; or (c)if through any
contract or understanding it is so arranged that the majority of the voting power may
be exercised, directly or indirectly, in behalf of any person who is not a citizen of the
United States; or (d)if by any other means whatsoever control of the corporation is
conferred upon or permitted to be exercised by any person who is nota citizen of the
United States.
(c) Seventy-five per centum of the interest in a corporation shall not be deemed to
be owned by citizens of the United States (a) if the title to 75 per centum of its stock is
not vested in such citizens free from any trust or fiduciary obligation in favor of any
person not a citizen of the United States; or Cb) if 75 per centum of the voting power
in such corporation is not vested in citizens of the United States; or (c) if, through any
contract or understanding, it is so arranged that more than 25 per centum of the
voting power in such corporation may be exercised, directly or indirectly, in behalf of
any person who is not a citizen of the United States; or (d)if by any other means
whatsoever control of any interest in the corporation in excess of 25 per centum is
conferred upon or permitted to be exercised by any person who is not a citizen of the
United States.
7. Id. § 888.
8. Id. § 802(a), (c). See also notes 137-53 infra and accompanying text.
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vessels owned by American citizens to noncitizens. 9 The Shipping Act
definition of corporate citizenship for purposes other than domestic
trade, including vessel transfers, requires that at least 50 percent of the
stock be held by United States citizens. 0
The Registry Acts," which specify the qualifications for documentation as a United States flag vessel, do not even permit aliens to register
their vessels under the United States flag to operate in the foreign trade,
but corporations with foreign stockholders, even those wholly owned by
aliens, theoretically may. Nonetheless, although less obvious and direct
in their application than the limitations respecting the domestic trade,
effective restraints on foreign investment in United States corporations
engaged in the foreign trade do exist. Section 37 of the Shipping Act
requires administrative approval for the purchase of a controlling interest
in a United States foreign trade carrier during time of war or national
emergency. 12 Further, foreign control over the carrier corporation, if
9. 46 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835 (1970). See notes 158-80 infra and accompanying text.
10. See 46 U.S.C. § 802(a), (c) (1970). Although it is not clear from subsection (a) of § 2
that "controlling interest" meant 50% ownership, that meaning becomes evident in light of
subsection (b) which speaks of a "majority of the stock." However, ownership of lesser
percentages of stock by aliens can constitute a "controlling interest." Therefore, a corporation does not atitomatically qualify for citizenship simply by meeting the 50% test. See
notes 148-51 infra and accompanying text.
11. 46 U.S.C. §§ 11-63 (1970) (derived from Act of December 31, 1792, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 288
(1792)).
12. Id. § 835. Subsection (e) requires, on penalty of forfeiture, the prior approval of the
Secretary of Commerce before making:
any agreement or. . . any understanding whereby there is vested in or for the benefit
of any person not a citizen of the United States, the controlling interest or a majority
of the voting power in a corporation which is organized under the laws of the United
States, or of any State, Territory, District, or possession thereof, and which owns
any vessel.
The phrase "any vessel" must be read in the context of § 37 as a whole, the primary import
of which is to require similar prior approval:
(a) To transfer to or place under any foreign registry or flag any vessel owned in
whole or in part by any person a citizen of the United States or by a corporation
organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or
possession thereof; or
(b) To sell, mortgage, lease, charter, deliver, or in any manner transfer . . . to
any person not a citizen of the United States, (1) any such vessel or any interest
therein, or (2) any vessel documented under the laws of the United States, or any
interest therein.
Id. § 37 Thus the purpose of subsection (e) of § 835 is to ensure that that which cannot be
effected directly (control over the vessel), cannot be effected indirectly through control
over the corporation owning the vessel. Subsection (e) applies to transfers of control of
carrier corporations engaged in the domestic or foreign trade. However, because more
stringent proscriptions against foreign participation in the domestic trade exist, see notes 5
supra, 124-57 infra and accompanying text, subsection (e) by itself constitutes a more
significant bar to transfers of control of foreign trade carriers. Pursuant to recently enacted
legislation, the powers of the Secretary of Commerce under § 37, including those
enumerated in subsection (e), will terminate on September 14, 1978. See notes 164-66 infra
and accompanying text.
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achieved, must necessarily be attenuated since section 2 of the Shipping
Act provides that the chief executive officer and the chairman of the
board of a United States carrier must be American citizens and that "no
more of its directors than a minority of the number necessary to constitute a quorum" can be aliens.' 3 Perhaps most importantly, carriers that
operate in the foreign trade under the United States flag do so because of

certain artificial inducements, principally construction and operating subsidies 14 and cargo preferences.1 5 Under the Merchant Marine Act of 1936
these subsidies are available only to United States corporations which6
qualify under the Shipping Act's definition of corporate citizenship.'
13. 46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1970). The Registry Acts similarly provide that "the President or
other chief executive officer and the chairman of the board of directors [of the domestically
organized corporation] shall be citizens of the United States." Id. § 11.
14. These subsidies are designed to defray the additional costs borne by American
foreign trade carriers in comparison with foreign flag carriers that arise from contracting for
the construction of the vessel within the United States and from operating under the United
States flag. Id. §§ 1151-83. Construction differential subsidies are available for ship purchasers who are United States citizens or for shipyards located in the United States in order
"to aid in the construction of a new vessel to be used in the foreign commerce of the United
States." Id. § 1151(a). The amount of the subsidy is determined by comparing construction
costs in the United States with those in foreign countries. The new vessel must "be suitable
for use by the United States for national defense or military purposes in time of war or
national emergency," and the Secretary of Commerce, with the approval of the Secretary of
the Navy, may require that certain features, designed for national defense purposes and
paid for by the United States, be incorporated into the vessel. Id. § l151(a)-(b). Such
construction differential subsidies may be granted, and the vessels built pursuant to such
subsidies may be sold, to citizens of the United States who possess "the ability, experience,
financial resources, and other qualifications necessary for the operation and maintenance"
of the new vessel. Id. §§ 1151(a)(2), 1152(a). The vessels must be documented and must
remain documented under the laws of the United States for at least twenty-five years. Id. §

1153.
A similar program for operating differential subsidies exists to provide financial aid to
United States citizens operating vessels documented under the laws of the United States in
"an essential service in the foreign commerce of the United States." Id. § 1171(a). An
essential service is defined as those routes from ports in the United States to foreign ports
that the Secretary of Commerce determines to be essential to the development, maintenance, and expansion of foreign commerce. Id. § 1121(a). This subsidy serves to defray the
additional operating expenses incurred solely because the vessel is documented under the
laws of the United States. Higher wages and insurance costs comprise the major part of the
differential. Other costs that may be included in the subsidy are subsistence costs of officers
and crew on passenger vessels, maintenance costs, and repair costs not covered by insurance. The subsidy is not available if the vessel engages in domestic trade, although a minor
exception is allowed for vessels primarily engaged in foreign trade that stop in more than
one American port during the course of a voyage. Id. § 1175(a). Persons receiving operating
differential subsidies are forbidden to own or operate, directly or indirectly, any foreign flag
vessel that competes with American vessels engaged in any essential service, id. § 1222(a),
or any vessel operating in the domestic trade, id. § 1223(a). For a further discussion of the
subsidies, see notes 181-88 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 35-39, 72-74 infra and accompanying text.
16. Section 905 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. § 1244(c) (1970), refers to
the definition of citizenship for business enterprises contained in the Shipping Act, note 6
supra.
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Thus foreign investment in foreign trade carriers is discouraged by the
unavailability of the rights and opportunities which make such investment
attractive.
The obvious objective of the legislative restraints on foreign investment is to foster a United States merchant marine. The fleet is artificially
protected against foreign competition by denying foreign operators the
right to compete in the domestic trade, subsidized to insure that foreign
competition will not obliterate it in the foreign trade, and kept intact by
prohibiting any deletion from its operators or vessels without administrative approval. In fact, the only appreciable gap in the restraints pertains to
foreign investment in the form of debt, which under certain circum-

stances is encouraged in order to foster the merchant marine. ' 7 Strangely,
17. The infusion of large amounts of capital in the form of debt ordinarily presupposes
the availability of collateral to secure the debt. The plant or other facilities of a company
engaged in ship repair and construction are its most valuable assets available to serve as
collateral. In the case of a water carrier, whose use and therefore need for capital frequently
relates to the purchase and operation of expensive vessels, the vessels themselves are the
most likely collateral available to secure the debt. The difference in the type of collateral
available to these two industries is the source of conflicting policies reflected in the Shipping
Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1970), and the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920, 46 U.S.C. §§ 911-84
(1970).
Sections 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act prohibit, without prior approval of the Secretary of
Commerce, the mortgage of an American vessel to an alien. Id. §§ 808, 835. Section 37, in
addition, requires similar approval for the mortgage of a vessel construction plant or facility
to an alien. Id. § 835(c). These provisions complement the limitations on other transfers
requiring Maritime Administration approval and ensure that those transactions that do
require approval cannot be accomplished indirectly without such approval.
Loans to finance the purchase of ships traditionally suffered from the lack of a reliable
security device. The vessel itself was not wholly satisfactory because, among other reasons,
a mortgage under common law was subordinate to any maritime liens which might attach to
the vessel. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358 F.2d 574, 580
(4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921 (1966). One of the purposes of the Ship Mortgage
Act of 1920 was to alleviate this problem and facilitate the massive transfer of government
vessels to private ownership after World War I in order to create a viable United States
merchant fleet. The Act created a procedure whereby the mortgagee can record his mortgage, 46 U.S.C. § 921 (1970), and thus secure a preferred mortgage having priority over the
claims of other creditors, including those holding maritime liens, id. § 922. Consistent with
the provisions of sections 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act, the Mortgage Act limited this
preferred status to mortgagees who were citizens of the United States. Id. § 922(a)(5). By
itself, this requirement would have greatly constricted the market for financing, thereby
undermining the primary purpose of the Mortgage Act to secure such financing. Therefore,
the Mortgage Act also provides that "[t]he term 'mortgagee,' in the case of a mortgage
involving a trust deed and a bond issue thereunder, means the trustee designated in such
deed." Id. § 911(5). This definition permits the issuance of a mortgage to a United States
trustee, without regard to the citizenship of the bondholders whose debt is secured by the
mortgage and trust instruments.
Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358 F.2d 574 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921 (1966), held that an indenture did not create a preferred mortgage
under the Ship Mortgage Act where the trustee was a United States citizen and the
bondholder an alien, because the issuance of a bond to an alien required approval under
sections 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act as the transfer of an "interest" in a vessel. In response
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the insight that injecting foreign funds into the merchant marine might be
more consistent with its growth than its demise seems to have been
confined to debt capital.
'Although the subject of foreign investment in the United States has
produced a plethora of debate, with particular focus on the desirability or
necessity of limiting investment in some areas, that debate has largely
omitted a reconsideration of the present American laws which circumscribe foreign investment in certain industries. Reconsideration of
the restraints on foreign investment in the merchant marine is long overdue. This Article seeks to articulate the major issues relevant to any such
review, and to respond tentatively to those issues.
Given that the goal of the restrictive legislation is to protect the merchant marine, we should consider why that fleet is necessary in the first
place, whether its growth has been successfully cultivated, and, most
importantly, how the foreign investment restraints relate to the growth of
the fleet. Although a United States merchant marine still engenders
substantial support, the interests it implicates today differ significantly
from those which it was thought to serve in the aftermath of World War I,
when the maritime restraints crystallized into their present form. Whereas at that time we sought to promote a merchant marine in order to
supplement the Navy in times of emergency and to expand foreign
trade, 18 our primary concerns today are jobs for United States seamen
and effective regulation over vessels in United States waters for safety,
environmental protection, and similar purposes. 19 The full panoply of
restraints on foreign investment does not serve these present interests.
to this decision, sections 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act were amended to provide that the
issuance to an alien of a bond or other evidence of indebtedness secured by a mortgage of a
vessel or vessel construction plant to a trustee is unlawful unless the Secretary of Commerce approves the trustee of the mortgage. Act of November 8, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-346,
§§ 1, 2(a), 3, 79 Stat. 1305 (amending 46 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835, 961 (1970)). The amendments
also require, however, that the Secretary grant approval if the trustee is a United States

citizen and meets certain-other requirements characteristic of large United States banks or
trust companies. 46 U.S.C. §§ 805, 835 (1970).
18. For example, § 1 of the Jones Act, enacted in 1920, states

It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and
domestic commerce that the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best
equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of

its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or.national
emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United
States. ...
46 U.S.C. § 861 (1970).
19. See notes 75-119 infra and accompanying text. Advertisements recently placed in
major newspapers by the U.S. Maritime Committee to Turn the Tide, described as a
"management coalition of shipbuilders, ship operators and marine supportive industries,"

demonstrates this shift in the policies supporting the merchant marine. Although lip service
is paid to the traditional justification for a merchant marine-"U.S. Flag Tankers
Strengthen Our National Defense"-the advertisement emphasizes that "Controls Placed
on U.S. Flag Tankers Help Protect Our Environment," and that "U.S. Flag Tankers Help
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I
THE MERCHANT MARINE AND NATIONAL INTERESTS
The interests likely to be involved in any decision affecting foreign
investment include: economic efficiency, the availability of capital, treaty
and policy commitments in favor of the free flow of funds, foreign
control over American political decisions, lack of a community of interests, and national security. 20 Of the interests most relevant in the context
of the merchant marine, national security is the one most frequently
invoked as the primary objective of the maritime restrictions. 2' Specifically, the various geographic and product market restraints as well as the
transfer limitations are said to promote a merchant marine which can
supplement United States naval forces in time of war, and keep the
United States economically strong at all times by maintaining a steady
flow of exports and imports. 22 At least two assumptions underlie this
belief: the utility of civilian craft for military or quasi-military purposes,
and the inability or unreliability of foreign flag vessels to carry America's
imports and exports. Both assumptions merit careful scrutiny.
A.

UTILITY AS NAVAL VESSELS

History has demonstrated the utility of the merchant marine as a
supplement to United States Navy vessels during war and national
emergencies. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Navy was
created almost entirely from the American merchant marine. 23 The lack
of an adequate merchant marine was viewed as a detriment during the
Put Americans Back to Work and Boost Our Economy." The statistics in the advertisement
emphasize these latter concerns:
Foreign oil tankers move a great deal of U.S. capital overseas. U.S. Flag ships
return 71€ from every dollar they receive to our economy. Liberian oil tankers
comprise 30.2% of the world's tanker tonnage, but 69% of all tanker tonnage lost last
year was Liberian. U.S. flag oil tankers are built to rigid safety specifications and are
subject to regular U.S. Coast Guard inspections. Safety standards are strictly enforced for manning and operating U.S. ships.
N.Y. Times, May 18, 1977, at A13.
20. Phillips, supra note 1, at 853-76.
21. See, e.g., Presidential Proclamation 4502, 42 Fed. Reg. 20281 (1977) (President Carter's proclamation in honor of National Maritime Day, 1977).
22. See note 18 supra. The Postwar Planning Committee, established by the United
States Maritime Commission to examine changes in American shipping due to World War II,
described six contributions to the national defense made by a strong merchant marine: (1) an
influence for the preservation of peace; (2) an increased ability either to remain neutral in
war or to act from strength during a war; (3) a wartime auxiliary to the armed forces; (4) the
ability to carry the attack to the enemy and keep the war on foreign soil, protecting United
States citizens and industries from the "ravages of attack"; (5) the ability to assist allies and
friendly neutrals; and (6) the ability to maintain the flow of essential imports. POSTWAR
PLANNING COMM., THE POSTWAR OUTLOOK FOR AMERICAN SHIPPING 4 (1946).
23. A. DENISON, AMERICA'S MARITIME HISTORY 78 (1944).
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Spanish American War when the United States needed ships to carry
forces to Cuba. 24 Conversion of merchant marine vessels into military
vessels continued through World War 125 and provided one of the key
assumptions underlying section 27 of the Jones Act.

The military function of the merchant marine in more recent conflicts
relates to the support functions it can provide for the Navy and its

carriage of essential civilian goods. 26 During World War II the vast
majority of the United States dry cargo fleet of 3,500 vessels was employed to transport military and civilian goods; only 15 percent of the
fleet was placed in actual custody of the armed services. 27 Today that
support function continues. All military shipping is now coordinated by
the Military Sealift Command. 28 Although the Military Sealift Command
has a nucleus fleet of its own, that fleet as of July 1976 numbered only
sixty-seven vessels, of which fifty-nine were active. 29 The United States
also maintains a National Defense Reserve Fleet which in theory could
carry a substantial portion of any necessary cargo in time of war or
national emergency. This fleet is composed of World War II vessels that
were not sold pursuant to the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946,30 and all
vessels in it are at least thirty years old. 31 In June 1976, the Commander of
24. L. BEMAN, SHIP SUBSIDIES 27 (1923).
25. S. LAWRENCE, UNITED STATES MERCHANT SHIPPING POLICIES AND POLITICS 24 (1966).
26. Id. at 25. Although Lawrence also mentions the potential conversion of merchant
vessels into naval vessels, he stresses the support functions and the importance of the
merchant marine as a training and proving ground for maritime personnel and equipment.
27. Id.
28. G. JANTSCHER, BREAD UPON THE WATERS: FEDERAL AIDS TO THE MARITIME INDUSTRIES 80 (1975). Before 1970, the Military Sealift Command went under the name of the

Military Sea Transportation Service (MSTS). Id. MSTS was formed in 1949 shortly after the
Department of Defense was created. S. LAWRENCE, supra note 25, at 196. However,
military operation and ownership of merchant vessels dates back to 1898; MSTS was merely
a continuation and consolidation of earlier merchant ship programs. Id. at 459. The Military
Sealift Command is designed to provide immediate sealift capability for the armed forces
overseas, to develop plans for necessary expansion during times of war or national emergency, and to provide sea transportation for Department of Defense cargo and personnel.
Ramage, The Military Sea TransportationService, NAVAL WAR C. REV., May 1969, at 5.
29. Letter from Larry C. Manning, Legislative Public Affairs Officer, Military Sealift
Command to Author (Aug. 5, 1976) (on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law
Journal). The nucleus fleet is composed of government owned vessels most of which are
operated by civilian crews under civil service employment. The remaining vessels are
manned by Navy crews or by seamen employed by private contractors who operate on a
cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 82. Since 1954 the size of the
nucleus fleet has been limited pursuant to an agreement between the Secretaries of Commerce and Defense. In effect, the agreement constituted a renunciation of any intent to
operate a government owned fleet capable of depriving the merchant marine of a sizeable
share of United States defense cargoes. Id. at 83. As of May 1, 1974, 76, or over 13%, of the
569 active privately owned vessels under the United States flag were on charter to the
Military Sealift Command. Kilgour, The Double-Subsidy Issue in Shipping, 6 J. MAR. L. &
COM: 395, 403 (1975).
30. Pub. L. No. 79-321, 60 Stat. 41 (1946).
31. Ramage, supra note 28, at 8.
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the Military Sealift Command concluded that the National Defense Reserve Fleet "now contains less than 130 potentially useful cargo ships." 32
Consequently, government vessels carry only a small percentage of the
cargo coordinated by the Military Sealift Command. Between fiscal years
1952 and 1972, the percentage of dry cargo shipped by the Military Sealift
Command on privately owned vessels never fell below 60.7 percent and
averaged 79.2 percent. Although privately owned vessels carried only
25.1 percent of the total military petroleum shipments in 1957 and only
36.6 percent in 1952, the average between 1952 and 1972 was 67.1 percent. 33 Privately owned United States flag vessels thus carry the bulk of
military cargo.
However, the fact that the Military Sealift Command relies heavily on
United States flag carriers does not demonstrate that foreign flag carriers
either could not or would not carry United States military cargo. The
Command uses foreign flag vessels only rarely,3 in large part because
United States law gives American flag vessels a preference. The Military
Transportation Act of 190435 provides that military cargo may be transported by sea only on vessels belonging to the United States or registered
under the United States flag unless the President finds the charges on
those vessels to be "excessive or otherwise unreasonable." Section
901(b) of the Merchant Marine Act of 193636 requires that at least 50
percent of the gross tonnage of certain goods be carried on privately
owned United States flag commercial vessels, if those vessels are available at "fair and reasonable rates." These commodities include: (1) goods
procured by the United States for its own account; (2) goods furnished to
foreign nations for which the United States has either advanced funds or
credits or guaranteed the convertibility of foreign currencies; and (3)
32. Moore, U.S. Seapower, SEALIFr, June 1976, at 4, 9.
33. Statistics derived from G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 84, Table 7-3. The figures are
nearly identical for the key years of the Vietnamese conflict, fiscal 1965 through 1974.
Privately owned commercial ships carried 76% of all military cargo worldwide and 68% of
all bulk petroleum products. Letter from Larry C. Manning, supra note 29.
34. The Military Sealift Command does not formally maintain statistics on the usage of
foreign flag vessels. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 86. The statistics that are available
show that foreign flag vessels did not carry more than one percent of the volume of Military
Sealift Command dry cargo shipments carried by liners in the years 1964, 1966, 1968, and
1969. Id. at 87. These statistics, however, do not include shipments originating outside the
United States, and the one percent figure is based on a comparison with shipments on liners
instead of total dry cargo shipments.
35. 10 U.S.C. § 2631 (1970).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (1970). The cargo preference requirements of section 901(b) may
be waived by Congress or temporarily waived by the President or Secretary of Defense
during a time of emergency. No temporary waiver has ever been declared. G. JANTSCHER,
supra note 28, at 80.
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goods the United States grants to foreign nations. 37 Significantly, the
standards used in determining whether rates are fair and reasonable are
the rates of other commercial vessels documented under the United
States flag, rather than foreign flag vessels. 38 In addition to the Military
Transportation Act and section 901, the choice of vessel for the carriage
of military goods is further distorted by a 1954 agreement between the
Secretaries of Commerce and Defense that prescribes the priorities for
the use of vessels when the Military Sealift Command's nucleus fleet
cannot satisfy military shipping needs. The Command must first make
maximum use of American liner services, followed by charters of privatethe Nationly owned United States flag vessels, vessels reactivated from
39
al Defense Reserve Fleet, and finally, foreign flag vessels.
The statutes and secretarial agreement make it difficult to distinguish
between problem and solution. Initially a merchant marine is fostered
because of the alleged military need; however, once existing, the merchant marine itself becomes the problem and the solution becomes man37. 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (1970). Section 901(b) applies not only to goods furnished directly
to foreign nations' but also to goods furnished to foreign nationals as part of statutory
programs designed in part to assist the economy of the particular nation. 42 Op. ATr'v GEN.
No. 14, at 12 (1963). For example, sales of surplus agricultural commodities to foreign
nationals pursuant to Title IV of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of
1954, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1731-36 (1970), ,are made under conditions more favorable to the foreign
purchaser than would be the case in purely private transactions. Consequently, § 901(b)
applies to the transportation of surplus commodities to the foreign buyer. For a complete list
of the government agencies subject to § 901(b), see 46 C.F.R. § 381.2(c) (1976). Congress
has provided several exceptions. E.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2353 (1970) (transportation between
foreign countries of commodities or defense articles purchased with foreign currency
derived from activities pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1954 or the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954).
38. 46 U.S.C. § 1241(b) (1970).
39. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 83. Although this agreement would literally prohibit
the use of foreign flag vessels if serviceable vessels remained in the National Defense
Reserve Fleet, the Military Sealift Command has used foreign flag vessels even though the
Fleet has not been fully activated since World War II. Id. at 83 n.22.
Another source of the cargo preference is Public Resolution No. 17, passed by Congress
in the mid-1930's. H.R.J. Res. 207, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 48 Stat. 500 (1934). In that
resolution Congress declared that all loans made by federal instrumentalities to foster the
export of agricultural or other products should provide that the exports should be carried
exclusively on United States flag vessels unless the Shipping Board Bureau determines that
such vessels are "not available in sufficient numbers, or in sufficient tonnage capacity, or
on necessary sailing schedule, or at reasonable rates." Id. In 1934 the Attorney General
interpreted the resolution as a nonmandatory rule of guidance to be applied only where
"feasible." 37 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 546, 548 (1934). In a subsequent opinion in 1965 the Attorney
General interpreted the resolution as not preventing the Maritime Administration from
permitting 50% of the goods to be transported on flag vessels of the recipient nation in
exchange for'that nation's adopting reciprocal nondiscriminatory practices. 42 Op. ATr'v
GEN. No. 20, at 2 (1965). The resolution affects only exports financed by the Export-Import
Bank of the United States. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 78. However, those exports are
significant; between 1964 and 1969 over I million long tons of exports financed by the Bank
were carried on United States flag vessels. Id. at 98.
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datory military use of such ships. Recognition of whether the need is
military transportation or sufficient cargo to satisfy a hungry merchant
marine would not be crucial if such cargo preferences did not carry a
price, but they obviously do. One authority has estimated that of the $8.6
billion spent by the Military Sealift Command from 1952 to 1972 to
procure shipping space on privately owned vessels, some $3 to $5 billion

represented
additional cost to the government because of the cargo pref40
erences.
It is, of course, difficult to quantify costs and benefits since the value
of the merchant marine relates not just to the carriage of routine military
shipments, but also to transport in times of emergency. Even with respect
to emergencies, however, other factors diminish the military role of the
merchant marine which the maritime restraints assume. First, the enactment of the Shipping Act in 1916 and the Jones Act in 1920 predated not
only the feasibility of air transport, but the probable desirability of that
form of transportation because of its speed. 41 For example, during the
1973 Arab-Israeli War, emergency supplies to both sides were transported
primarily by air, not sea. 42 Second, foreign flag vessels owned by United
States citizens are subject to requisition during times of emergency under
section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 43 and other foreign flag
vessels lying idle in United States waters, regardless of ownership, may
be requisitioned under the Emergency Foreign Vessels Acquisition Act of
1954." The Department of Defense considers some of the American
40. Id. at 87-89, 145 app.
41. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) was created for the purpose of providing
emergency air transport. The CRAF fleet consists of civilian aircraft owned by United
States air carriers and designated by them, in an agreement with the Department of Defense,
as available for military transportation during emergencies. See generally Cooke, The Civil
Reserve Fleet, A.F. JAG L. REV., May-June 1968, at 6. As of July 1, 1975, the number of
aircraft in CRAF numbered 332. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
-TRANSPORTATION, CIVIL RESERVE AIR FLEET (CRAF) ALLOCATION (1975). Interestingly, the
dynamics between the government and the private sector that operates with respect to water
cargo carriage also pertain to air cargo carriage. Once CRAF exists, there is enormous
pressure on the Military Airlift Command (MAC) - the air counterpart of the Military Sealift Command-to utilize the services of the private carriers who have pledged aircraft to
CRAF. Thus the private carriers greeted MAC's acquisition of a large fleet of C-5A cargo
planes with some misgivings. Schemmer, MAC's PrivateAirline, ARMED FORCES J., Sept.
21, 1970, at 26.
42. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1973, at 50.
43. 46 U.S.C. § 1242(a) (1970). This section authorizes the requisition or purchase of
"any vessel or other watercraft owned by citizens of the United States, or under construction within the United States," as well as the requisition or charter of such vessels if
governmental ownership is not required. Id. The authority granted by § 902 may be
exercised whenever the President proclaims "that the security of the national defense
makes it advisable or during any national emergency declared by proclamation of the
President." Id.
44. 50 U.S.C. § 196 (1970). The law authorizes the President:
to purchase, or to requisition, or. . . to charter or requisition the use of, or to take
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owned foreign flag vessels to be part of the "effective United States

control" fleet, which, as the term implies, connotes foreign flag vessels
45
which could be brought under United States control when needed.

The effectiveness of United States control over these vessels has been
debated. Doubts about that effectiveness have been expressed on the
grounds that the basis of the right of the United States to control the
vessels-the citizenship of the owners--conflicts with the traditional
right of the country of registry to control its vessels, 46 and that the owners
may not be able to force their alien crewmen to comply with American
directives. 47 Both concerns seem inflated. Many if not most of the vessels
over the title to or the possession of... any merchant vessel not owned by citizens
of the United States, which is lying idle in waters within the jurisdiction of the
United States . . . which the President finds to be necessary to the national
Id. defense.
Another law granting similar powers provides that the President, in time of war, acting
through the Secretary of the Army, "may take possession and assume control of all or part
of any system of transportation to transport troops, war material, and equipment, or for
other purposds related to the emergency." 10 U.S.C. § 4742 (1970). The predecessor of this
law, Act of August 29, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-242, 39 Stat. 619, 645 (1916), was used during
the Korean War and World War II to take possession of railroads. Exec. Order No. 1041,3
C.F.R. 322 (1949-1953 Compilation); Exec. Order No. 9412, 3 C.F.R. 291 (1943-1948
Compilation); Exec. Order No. 9108, 3 C.F.R. 1127 (1938-1943 Compilation). There is no
apparent reason, however, to limit the law's grant of authority to the taking possession of
railroads or land transportation systems. Moreover, this law is worded more broadly than §
902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, encompassing "any system of transportation," and
it could potentially provide authority to take possession of foreign-owned transportation
systems, including foreign flag vessels, if physical control over those systems were possible.
45. U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, EFFECTIVE UNITED STATES CONTROL OF MERCHANT

SHIPS 4 (1970). The Department of Defense has cited the following grounds for its belief that
the effective control fleet can be brought under actual United States control: "Contracts
with the Maritime Administration or assurances provided the United States Government by
the shipowners," the World War II precedents of the assimilation into the American war
effort of Panamanian and Honduran vessels owned by United States citizens, as well as the
"[a]bsence of operational control restrictions in the laws of Panama, Honduras and Liberia,
the limited shipping requirements on the part of these nations, and the probability that they
will remain neutral in the event of war." Letter from Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary
of Defense, to Senator Warren Magnuson (Nov. 17, 1961) quoted in id.
46. See B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE 195 (1962); R. RIENOW, THE TEST OF THE

NATIONALITY OF A MERCHANT VESSEL 7, 100-04, 185-86 (1937). European shipowners in
1939 apparently escaped the requisition of their vessels by changing to Panamanian registry.
B. BOCZEK, supra at 198.
47. Private maritime interests in the United States have asserted that "any fleet under
foreign registry and manned by foreign crews is less reliable than U.S. flag vessels manned
by U.S. citizens." G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 130. Maritime unions and other private
interests are not alone in this concern. Navy personnel have expressed doubts as to the
potential reliability of the alien crews on these vessels. They question both the willingness of
the crews to submit to United States jurisdiction initially, and the amenability of the crews
to orders once the vessels are requisitioned. E.g., McCleave, The NationalDefenseRequirement for a U.S. FlagMerchantMarine, NAVAL WAR C. REV., June 1969, at 64,74. Admiral
Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former Chief of Naval Operations, has
stated that foreign flag vessels involve political risks and are not as dependable as the United
States Merchant Marine. J. BARKER & R. BRANDWEIN, THE UNITED STATES MERCHANT
MARINE IN NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

59 (1970).
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in the United States control fleet are covered by contracts between the
owners and the United States which permit the United States to charter
the vessels on demand. 48 These contracts are recognized under a treaty
with Panama, 49 and each contract involving a Liberian-documented vessel is concurred in by the Liberian government." While most of the
vessels do have foreign crews, many of the crews consist wholly or
partially of NATO nationals. 5' Moreover, although emergency planning
should leave room for a margin for error, one Maritime Administration
official involved with such planning opines that because "[n]early all of
the Liberian and Panamanian flag ships are bulk carriers, which are
essential for support of the national economy but not useful for direct
support of national defense operations, [the continued operation] of the
ships under neutral flags in wartime obviously might have advantages,
and the desirability of requisitioning would have to be evaluated .... ",52
In sum, it might be erroneous to conclude that present data and
emergency contingency planning demonstrate that a continued United
States merchant marine is not necessitated by its military or quasimilitary function. They do indicate, however, that the role of the merchant marine in any future conflict would differ significantly from its role
during the immediate aftermath of World War I as the exclusive means of
overseas transport.
B.

THE FOREIGN TRADE

Not long after the post World War I decade in which the Shipping Act
and Jones Act were passed, the focus of the merchant marine shifted
from national defense to foreign trade, the second national security
ground allegedly necessitating a protected merchant marine. In 1929 the
National Industrial Conference Board argued in favor of expanding the
United States merchant fleet on four grounds, all related to the foreign
trade: (1)it would be dangerous for the United States, as an industrial
power competing for raw materials and the sale of manufactured products, to become overdependent on foreign flag vessels since foreign ship
owners would not be interested in protecting America's commercial relations; (2) reliance on foreign vessels would increase the dangers of discriminatory treatment, loss of valuable trade information to competitors,
48. Letter from Frank B. Case, Chief, Division of Emergency Plans, United States
Department of Commerce Maritime Administration, to Author (July 30, 1976) (on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, supra note 45, at 10-20.
52. Letter from Frank B. Case, supra note 48.

1978]

MERCHANT MARINE

and loss of ships if needed by the home country; (3) a merchant marine
would protect the United States from unreasonable foreign rates; and (4)
a merchant marine would develop new markets for United States exports.5 3 These national preference arguments fail to take into account the
fact that a good number of foreign flag *vessels are owned by United
States citizens.5 4 It is also questionable whether prior experience supported these fears, 55 but even assuming it did, the relevant issue today is
whether the merchant marine is currently needed to expand foreign trade.
Three relationships may be hypothesized between a United States
merchant marine and foreign trade. The first, on which the foreign investment restraints are premised, is that there is a positive correlation between the two. If so, one would expect that increased utilization of the
merchant marine would be accompanied by greater trade. The second
possible correlation is negative. American exports may in fact decline to
the extent they are carried on United States flag vessels. A third possibility, of course, is the absence of any correlation between the two. Certain
facts bear on these hypotheses, even if they do not conclusively prove or
negate any of them. Table 1 sets forth the size or value of waterborne
exports and imports and the percentage of those goods which were
carried by United States flag vessels for certain years since 1900.
In light of these statistics, which depict a declining percentage of export
carriage aboard United States flag vessels, one would expect the total
export trade to have decreased if a positive relationship exists between
the merchant marine and foreign trade. United States exports, however,
have skyrocketed. Recent figures support the trends depicted in Table 1.
For example, during 1974 exports amounted to $98.5 billion, an increase
of $27.2 billion over 1973.56 Yet vessels under the United States flag
carried only 5.8 percent of those 1974 exports which were waterborne57
compared with 6.0 percent in 1973.58 Exports for 1975 and 1976 increased
53. NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, THE AMERICAN MERCHANT MARINE

56 (1929).
54. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1977, at 46, col. I (one-third of all Liberian-flag vessels).
55. Between 1900 and 1910, American ships carried only about 10% of the United States
foreign trade, and most of that 10% involved trade with Cuba, Canada, and Mexico. During
World War I, many of the foreign ships upon which the United States foreign trade
depended stopped carrying imports (resulting in shortages of commodities such as coffee,
tea, sugar, and rubber) and exports (causing cotton, tobacco, machinery, and automobiles to
pile up in warehouses). A. DENISON, supra note 23, at 129-33. On the other hand, statements
to the effect that a weak merchant marine would result in the loss of valuable trade
PROBLEM

information and new markets seem exaggerated.
56. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES: 1975, at 812 (1975).
57. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. WATERBORNE EXPORTS AND

GENERAL IMPORTS 11 (Table E-2) (1974 Annual).
58. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 56, at 597.

TABLE I.-

Waterborne imports and exports of the United States a
Exports

Imports
year

total
trade

% U.S.
flag

millions ofb
short tons
715
539

6.4
5.6

total
imports

% on U.S.
flag

total
exports

% on U.S.
flag

427

8.1

323
254

12.3
23.5

256
199
141

6.1
9.9
26.5

172
124
113

11.1
16.3
19.6

39.3

97

43.7

63

32.5

23.6
42.6

117.5
81.9

26.8
45.3

68.4
63.5
30.5
32.4
37.8
36.6

35.2
27.7

79.7
79.8

82.4
35.3
55.0
42.6

19.0
36.3
61.2
53.0

36.1
30.4
41.3
37.7

40.7
41.6
47.2
43.8

39.8
30.5
40.4

21.4
23.2
28.0

42.9

30.2

159
thousands of
long tonsc
199.9
117.2

90.2
70.3
76.0
60.9
81.7
80.6
millions of
dollarsd

3,786
5,803
7,940

1,813
2,635

11,983

4,731
2,577

7,803
3,992
2,983
2,394

2,090

1,973

35.7

3,168
4,224
7,252

35.3
34.9
43.6

1,526

5,226
2,466

18.9
11.8

1,467
1,039
806

1,516
1,355
1,284

7.5
9.6

3,716

12.9

a. This table is drawn from three governmental sources, each of which used other
governmental data in preparing the statistics. No measure of foreign trade could be found
that was used consistently from 1900 to the present. The overlap in years in the table should
give a rough indication of how the change in measure affects the trends depicted by the data.
b. Statistics derived from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 597 (1975). This portion of the table
excludes commodities classified as "Special Category" for security reasons, Department of
Defense exports that were grant-aid shipments, and import shipments after 1955 that were
under 2000 pounds shipping weight.
c. Statistics derived from MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'TOF COMMERCE, THE
HANDBOOK OF MERCHANT SHIPPING STATISTICS THROUGH 1958, at 163-65 (1959). This portion
of the table excludes military cargoes and cargoes carried on the Great Lakes. 1950 and 1955
figures exclude "Special Category" cargoes. 1943 and 1945 figures include all cargoes
carried by vessels under United States control, not merely United States flag vessels. Thus,
even these wartime figures of carriage aboard United States vessels are exaggerated.
d. Statistics derived from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957, at 452 (1960). This
portion of the table includes all waterborne imports and exports on the Great Lakes, and the
data for the years 1900 to 1915 are computed on years ending on June 30th.
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to $107.1 billion and $114.8 billion, respectively; 9 nevertheless, carriage
aboard United States flag vessels accounted for only 5.4 percent 6° and 5.9
percent 6' of the total for these two years. Similarly, the percentage of
total imports transported on American ships has decreased in recent
years. United States flag vessels carried only 7.6 percent62 of 1974 imports of $100.3 million, 63 5.4 percent' of 1975 imports of $96.1 million, 65
and 4.7 percent 66 of 1976 imports of $120.7 million. 67 Arguably and ironically, the increasing foreign trade and the decline in the amount of that
trade carried aboard United States vessels may indicate a negative correlation between the two. 68 In much trade, especially foreign trade, transportation constitutes one of the highest transaction costs involved; the

more that cost decreases, the more the cost of the total product should
decrease and demand for the product should increase. Given the higher
cost of transporting goods aboard United States flag vessels compared to
foreign ships, 69 the level of American exports and imports can be expect-

ed to be inversely related to their carriage aboard United States flag
vessels.
The relationship between the cost of an export and the cost of transportation is illustrated by shipments made under the Agricultural Trade
59. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, OVERSEAS BUSINESS REPORTS 3 (Sept. 1977).
60. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. WATERBORNE EXPORTS AND
GENERAL IMPORTS 11 (1975 Annual).
61. The calculations are based on data contained in the monthly reports of the BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. WATERBORNE EXPORTS AND GENERAL IM-

ports, (Trade Area, District, Port, Type Service, and U.S. Flag) (Jan.-Dec. 1976).
62. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 57, at 22 (Table 1-2).
63. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 59, at 3.
64. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 60, at 11.
65. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 59, at 3.
66. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 61.
67. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 59, at 3.
68. Although the sample is small, a regression of the figures in the first two columns of
Table 1 indicates that the correlation between the percentage of American cargo carried on
United States flag ships (X) and total trade (Y) is not positive. The correlation for the figures
expressed in millions of short tons is negative at the 97% confidence level (Y = 604.1 12.69X, t = -2.98, R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom = 61.1%). There appears to be no
correlation between total trade in millions of long tons and percentage of cargo on United
States flag ships (Y = 145.5 - 1.129X, t = -1.09, R 2 adjusted for degrees of freedom =
2.5%).
69. There are a variety of elements that contribute to the higher total cost of transportation on American flag vessels, including the higher costs of initial construction, maintenance and repair, insurance, wages, and subsistence payments. Of these, wages comprise
the major component; in 1969, wages represented 84.6% of the total operating differential
subsidy. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 22, Table 3-1. The remaining 15.4% was divided
among insurance on the vessel hull and machinery (8.0%), maintenance and repairs
(6.3%), and subsistence (1.1%). Id. The competitive disadvantage of United States flag
vessels created by higher wages existed before World War I. E. JOHNSON & G. HUEBNER,
PRINCIPLES OF OCEAN TRANSPORTATION 454-57 (1918).
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Development and Assistance Act of 1954,70 which probably accounted for
one-fifth of all cargoes carried on United States flag vessels engaged in
the foreign trade between 1955 and 1970. 11Like military cargoes, most of
these shipments are subject to section 90 1(b) of the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936.72 Section 901(b) added at least $840.1 million to the cost of the
sales part of the Food for Peace Program between 1955 and July 1971 .3
Other foreign aid programs, most of which are administered by the
Agency for International Development, are also subject to section 901 (b).
The additional cost of these programs for the same period resulting from
compliance with this section was roughly $600 million.7 4
The application of cargo preference legislation amplifies the problemsolution confusion identified with respect to military cargo. The purported need to expand foreign trade justifies protection of a United States
merchant marine; once existing, pressures mount to utilize that merchant
marine in the United States foreign trade, even if that trade could be
carried by other vessels at less expense. Required usage of the merchant
marine raises the cost of importing,- which produces higher prices for
consumers, and increases the cost of exporting, which hampers sales of
American products abroad. Expansion of foreign trade, then, hardly
justifies protecting the United States merchant marine. Protection of the
merchant marine must be based on other grounds that outweigh these
negative economic consequences.
C.

JOBS FOR MERCHANT SEAMEN

The most vociferous proponents of the United States merchant marine
are the maritime unions.7 5 Although their arguments reflect various purported concerns, 76 the primary motivation of the maritime unions, quite
obviously, is to protect the jobs of merchant seamen. This interest has
70. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1427, 1431, 1691-1736 (1970). The Act, popularly called the Food for
Peace Program, provides financing for the sale and donation of agricultural commodities
to less developed countries. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 89-90.
71. Id. at 91.
72. Id. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
73. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 92.

74. Id. at 97.
75. The advocacy of the maritime unions takes various forms. For example, it has been
charged that the Carter administration proposal to require greater carriage of imported oil
aboard United States flag vessels is "a blatant political payoff" for the maritime union
support, financial and otherwise, during the 1976 Presidential campaign. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1977, at 1,col. 5. The maritime unions also vigorously oppose any transfer of a
vessel that might result in the vessel's documentation under another flag. See note 102
infra.

76. See, e.g., Letter to the Editor from J.M. Calhoon, President, Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1977, at 30, col. I (explaining how foreign
flag tankers are used for tax avoidance purposes).
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now become the national interest, recognized by both the executive
branch and Congress.
The Merchant Seamen Act,77 passed in 1936, provides that all licensed
officers and pilots of American vessels must be citizens of the United
States and that, upon departure from a United States port, at least 75
percent of the crew, excluding the licensed officers, must also be citizens
of the United States, unless the Commandant of the Coast Guard determines that compliance with the 75 percent citizenship requirement is
impossible because of an insufficient number of qualified citizen seamen. 78 The operating subsidy available to United States foreign trade
carriers also represents direct congressional recognition of this interest.
Although the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 refers to eligible vessels in
terms of ships which are "used in an essential service in the foreign
commerce of the United States," ' 79 the subsidy seems more related to
American labor than American commerce. First, on cargo vessels that
have received a construction or operating subsidy, all crew members
must be citizens of the United States. 80 Further, although the subsidy
serves to defray many of the additional operating expenses incurred
because the vessel is documented under the laws of the United States,
higher wages comprise the major part of the differential. 8 The "subsidizable wage costs" '82 are directly and indirectly related to the "collective
bargaining costs," 83 which the statute defines as "the annual cost. . . of
all items of expense required of the applicant through collective bargaining or other agreement.''

4

The interests of American labor have been recognized in more subtle
ways as well. For example, the administrative approval required under
sections 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act 85 for the transfer of vessels to aliens
is that of the Secretary of Commerce. Within the Department of Commerce, the obligations of the Secretary have been delegated to the
Maritime Administration, which evaluates each application for transfer of
vessels in excess of 3,000 gross tons to foreign registry or ownership "on
its individual merits." 86 The criteria utilized by the Maritime Administration in considering the application to transfer include the "national inter77. 46 U.S.C. §§ 542-713 (1970).
78. Id. § 672(a). In addition, an 1884 statute requires the commander of the vessel and
all officers having charge of a watch, including pilots, to be citizens. Id. § 221.
79. Id. § 1171(a).
80. Id. § 1132(a).
81 G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 22. See note 69 supra.

82. 46 U.S.C. § 1173(b) (1970).
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. § 1173(c)(1)(A).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 808, 835.
46 C.F.R. § 221.7 app. 1 (1976).
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est." ' Notice of each proposed transfer is published in the Federal
Register, and interested groups are invited to respond with comments.
That response, in part, provides the content of the "national interest."
One interested party that invariably responds is the labor union that
represents the workers affected by the transfer.18
But, to what extent are jobs for merchant seamen in fact jeopardized
by foreign fleets? The employment risks in the domestic and foreign
trade seem to differ. If foreign flag vessels were permitted to engage
regularly in the domestic trade, nothing would bar the application of
American law to the vessels. 89 Thus, American wage rates could apply.
With no differential in wage rates, there is no apparent reason why
foreign seamen would be preferred over their American counterparts.
Immigration laws, in fact, might require employment of only United
States citizens or resident aliens on vessels engaged in the domestic
trade. 90
On the other hand, application of American labor laws to vessels
engaged in the foreign trade under foreign flags poses more substantial
conceptual difficulties. 91 Moreover, it is improbable that most foreign
87. Id.
88. Interview with Burton Kyle, Director of the Office of Domestic Shipping, and
Virginia O'Brien, Maritime Administration, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 23, 1975) [hereinafter
cited as Kyle and O'Brien interview].
89. The United States Supreme Court has stated a number of times that Congress has
the power under the Constitution to apply federal laws governing unions, union organizing, and picketing to the crews of foreign flag vessels, at least while these vessels are in
American waters. See, e.g., American Radio Ass'n v. Mobil S.S. Ass'n, 419 U.S. 215 (1974);
Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104 (1974); Incres
S.S. Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 (1963); McCulloch v.
Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 19 (1963). The Court, however,
has also held that the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations
Act were not intended to apply to foreign flag vessels. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo,
353 U.S. 138 (1957).
90. For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1970) defines excludable aliens as persons:
seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled
labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of
State and to the Attorney General that (A) there are not sufficient workers in the
United States who are able, willing, qualified, and available at the time . . . and at
the place . . . and (B) the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the
wages and working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly employed.
As of June 1, 1975, United States flag merchant vessels of 1,000 gross tons and over
(excluding vessels operated on inland waterways and the Great Lakes, vessels operated for
the Army and Navy, and certain special types of vessels) employed approximately 20,500
seamen. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES: 1976, at 624 (1976). Yet membership in seafaring unions that could man
such jobs approximated 82,000. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
SEAFARING GUIDE & DIRECTORY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT AFFILIATIONS 3 (1975).

91. If a foreign flag vessel were to regularly engage in the United States domestic trade,
both the geographical location of the vessel-within United States territorial waters-and
the activity of the vessel-transportation of cargo between two points in the United States-
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trade operators would retain their vessels under the United States flag
without the subsidies and cargo preferences that accompany the flag. The
chief consequence of a transfer of vessels from United States to foreign
documentation might well be the substitution of cheaper foreign labor for
American labor.
Recognizing, however, that there might be a loss of American jobs,
especially in the foreign trade, the question that arises is whether there is
anything particular about a seaman's task which should differentiate his
job from those of others. In one respect, this problem-the loss of
American jobs to foreign labor-does not differ in substance from the
problems created by all other competition involving the export and import
of goods. The seaman's services in delivering the product are economically indistinguishable from the foreign worker's service in producing the
product. In the latter case, the United States with few exceptions has
adopted a policy of free trade. If the lower cost of foreign labor results in
the production of certain goods at a lower total cost, sucfh goods are
admitted free from discrimination. Although subsidies are sometimes
provided in these situations, 92 such aid is usually limited to providing
benefits to those American workers displaced by the foreign competition.
Yet it may be argued that there are at least two distinguishing characteristics of the seaman's job. First, the merchant seaman may have skills
which can be utilized during wartime, 93 an argument closely allied with
the necessity of the merchant marine for military purposes. The need for
seamen for defense purposes, however, is minimized by the existence of
a standing Navy with ships, guns, aircraft, and specialized personnel. In
emergency situations, United States seamen employed in the domestic
trade could probably fill gaps in naval services equally as well as seamen
employed in the foreign trade-where the jobs are at risk. Moreover, in
terms of national defense, there is no reason to distinguish the seaman's
job from many others. We also need transistors in times of war, and the
persons who can manufacture them. Should we restrict the import of
transistors on the ground that we must retain a group of skilled workers in
that field because foreign sources would be unreliable if a war arose? At
some point the attenuated interests of national defense with respect to
presently unforeseeable emergencies must be balanced against the policy
would justify subjecting it to American regulation despite its foreign registry. See notes 11619 infra and accompanying text. If, on the other hand, the foreign flag vessel engages in the
foreign trade, the propriety of applying American law, on the theory that the vessel affects

American interests more than the interests of any other nation, becomes much more
suspect. A difficult conflict of laws problem would arise if the other foreign nations which it
serves also passed legislation applying their labor laws to the same vessel.
92. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2292 (Supp. V 1975) (trade adjustment allowance for injuries
caused by import competition).

93. A. DENISON, supra note 23, at 135-37.
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in favor of the free flow of goods and services, on which the United
States has based its international economic relations since World War
II.4 Although that policy, if followed blindly, could lead to unwanted
consequences., it is based upon the legitimate premise that free trade
95
fosters economic efficiency.
The second difference, it has been argued, is that because of their
allegedly superior skill, American seamen are better able to protect the
environment. 96 The relationship between the environment and the merchant marine will be examined in the next section of this Article. For
now, it is sufficient to note that if in fact American crews are generally
considered safer than foreign crews, one would expect that safety .factor
to have a noticeable impact on insurance rates over a period of time.
Therefore, regardless of seamen's wages, employing an American crew
would presumably be less costly relative to.using foreign crews than it
now is.
The loss of seamen's jobs, moreover, could be handled by means other
than protecting the merchant marine in the foreign trade. Although the
Maritime Administration reports that69,342 merchant seamen found full
or part-time employment aboard United States flag vessels in calendar
year 1975, 7 the Bureau of the Census estimates that only 20,500 persons
were employed on United States merchant ships weighing over 1,000
gross tons. 98 This latter figure probably exceeds the number regularly
employed in the foreign trade. The Maritime Administration also reports
that the total operating differential subsidy for fiscal year 1976 was $305.4
million. 99 In other words, the operating differential subsidy alone amounted to over $14,900 for each merchant seaman involved in the foreign
trade.'°0 Several alternatives, each less expensive than the current protection afforded the merchant marine, are available. For example, the government might offer adjustment assistance to seamen displaced by
foreign flag vessels similar to that available to other workers displaced by
94. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 855.
95. Id. at 855-61.
96. See note 19 supra.
97. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T

OF COMMERCE,

MARD '76,

THE ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE MARITIME ADMINISTRATION FOR FISCAL YEAR AND THE TRANSITION QUARTER

ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 1976, at 45 (April 1976).
98. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 90, at 624. This figure excludes employment on
vessels operated on inland waters and the Great Lakes, United States Army and Navy
owned and operated vessels, tug boats, and other-special types of vessels.
99. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, supra note 97, at 69.
100. The operating subsidy compensates for more than the wage differential and should
not be confused with the wage differential per seaman, which is a component of the
operating differential and is therefore necessarily less. Since wages represent roughly 80%
of the total operating differential, the wage differential per seaman is approximately
$11,920. See note 69 supra.
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import competition.' 0' Assuming that weekly wage benefits averaged
$200 and that no-unemployment compensation was paid, that adjustment
allowance would equal $10,400 annually. A second possibility, of course,
is simply to pay the seamen for not working. This alternative is hardly
politically feasible, but it does illustrate the tremendous cost the United
States incurs to protect the merchant marine in order to assure jobs for
merchant seamen.
It is doubtful that the seaman's job can be sufficiently differentiated
from those of other workers to justify the high cost of maintaining the
anticompetitive restraints. Nevertheless, this concern seems to have been
accepted as a proper component of the national interest served by the
merchant marine,' 02 - a component which differs from the national security concerns previously identified. Although the merchant marine does
not serve to expand the foreign trade and its relationship to military
preparedness can be debated, it does supply jobs for United States
seamen. In this instance there is a direct correlation between the interest
identified and the institution supported.
D. ENVIRONMENTAL AND SAFETY CONCERNS
Support for the United States merchant marine has recently grown as a
result of the environmental damage inflicted by foreign flag vessels on
United States shores and territorial seas. The environmental problem is
allegedly indicative of the purported lack of regulatory control exercised
over foreign flag vessels in general. The Maritime Administrator has
commented: "The fact is, you can't expect small countries who gather a
great deal of their revenue from registering foreign ships . . to exercise
stringent control of those ships. They want that revenue. They want those
fees. If Panama exercises strict control, the ships will run to Liberia. If
101. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2271-98 (Supp. V 1975). The adjustment assistance includes,
aniong other things: an adjustment allowance, generally equal to 70% of the worker's
average weekly wage, available for one year, id. §§ 2292,2293; job search allowances, id. §
2297; and relocation allowances, id. § 2298.
102. In light of the high cost involved for everyone but the seamen, the merchant marine
will likely receive less sympathetic recognition if it is justified explicitly on the basis of this
interest. For example, the Carter administration recently proposed legislation that would
have required 9.5% of imported oil to be carried on United States flag vessels. N.Y. Times,
Aug. 26, 1977, at 1, col. 5. If enacted, that legislation would have purportedly added an

additional $240 million, id. (General Accounting Office estimates), to an additional $610
million annually to the cost of oil paid by American consumers, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1977,

at 1,col. I (the General Accounting Office revised its earlier estimate in order to take into
consideration price increases in domestically produced oil in response to changes in the
world market). The legislation was defeated in the House of Representatives after disclo-

sure of the additional cost of the legislation to American consumers and charges that advocacy of the legislation was due to campaign contributions from the maritime unions.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1977, at 27, col. 2.
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the Liberians do it, they go to Malaysia."10 3 Thus the competitive marketplace of nations seeking franchise tax revenues frustrates effective
maritime regulation. In that marketplace lowest cost assumes the form of
minimal regulation.
Both the strength of United States regulation in comparison with
foreign control-particularly Liberian and Panamanian control-and the
hazards resulting from lack of effective regulation have been documented. In 1975 and 1976, oil spills, mostly from foreign flag vessels,
amounted to 188,000 tons and 200,000 tons respectively. 104 Both the
Sansinena, which split in two in the Los Angeles Harbor in 1975, and the
Argo Merchant, which caused a gigantic spill off the East Coast in 1976,
were Liberian vessels. 10 5 The Sansinena incident might have been avoided by a relatively inexpensive gas inerting system, 1' 6 and the Argo Merchant mishap by a moderately priced radio navigation device designed for
long-range position fixing at sea. 7 The absence of meaningful regulation
by foreign nations has a particularly great impact on the United States
since we have no deep-water ports. Although foreign fleets often include
modern oil tankers and other vessels equipped with the latest safety
features, the ships that commonly visit United States waters are smaller
and older and, therefore, far more likely to be involved in mishaps
causing environmental damage and human loss."'s The United States, in
contrast to many other nations, has promulgated extensive regulations
dealing with the safety and navigation of all of its flag vessels. 19
But the fact that environmental damage is rising and that United States
regulation is more stringent than most, if not all, foreign regulation does
not necessarily establish the need for a United States merchant marine. It
might be argued that the United States could exercise stricter safety and
other regulatory controls over foreign flag vessels which enter United
States waters or impose greater liability on the persons involved in the
103. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1977, at 14, col. 4.
104. Ulman, Navigation and the Troubled Tankers, Wall St. J.,Feb. 15, 1977, at 22, col.
4.
105. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1977, at 46, col. 1;N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, at 10, col. 3.
106. Id. at col. 6.
107. Ulman, supra note 104, at col. 5.
108. Wall St. J., MArch 21, 1977, at 5, col. I. The new regulations to be adopted by the
Carter administration apply to vessels of more than 20,000 deadweight tons entering United
States ports. Regulations covering this broad range of vessels, rather than only the larger
classes of ships, are considered necessary because most vessels entering United States
ports, due to the absence of deep-water facilities, are relatively small.
109. See generally 46 C.F-.R. §§ I to 196.85-1 (1976). For example, Subchapter D (Tank
Vessels) of the Coast Guard's regulations includes special construction requirements and
other provisions for carrying certain flammable or dangerous cargoes in bulk, id. § 40
(1970); Subchapter F (Marine Engineering) includes requirements for various boilers, id. §§
52, 53, piping systems, id. § 56, and periodic tests and inspections, id. § 61; Subchapter I
(Cargo and Miscellaneous Vessels) requires certain life-saving and fire-protection equipment, id. §§ 94, 95.
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vessels' operations, including the stockholders and customers of the

transported commodity. Other possible approaches that address the environmental concern include international and private party action.
Because foreign vessels carrying cargo to or from American ports
would seem to be involved irl more than "innocent passage,",' 10 applica-

tion of American law to such vessels would be consistent with international law."' However, the legal right of the United States to exercise
regulatory control over these foreign flag vessels and its effective ability
to do so are different matters12 Even if the Coast Guard were able to
recognize the approach of every foreign ship and inspect such ships for
every safety feature required by its regulations, this mode of enforcement
would be prohibitively expensive. Initial and periodic inspections of
vessels documented in the United States possibly offer a more feasible
means of ensuring compliance. As to inducing compliance with safety
standards by imposing liability on persons other than the corporate owner, numerous problems arise: how can we identify the stockholders; is it
equitable to pass legislation imposing liability without proof of knowledge
as to the lack of certain safety features; and if not, would requiring such
proof minimize the deterrent effect of the law? If problems of proof
necessary to establish liability make its imposition infrequent or unlikely,
insurance against such liability might well be affordable regardless of the
identity of the insured. Without substantial deterrent effect, imposition of
liability does not address all environmental concerns because, by definition, these concerns extend beyond the problem of after-the-fact monetary compensation for damage that has occurred. For the same reason,
private efforts such as TOVALOP" 3 and CRISTAL," 4 two private com110. "Innocent passage" is defined as navigation through the territorial sea that is "not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Convention on the
Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 14, § 4, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964).
Ill. The 1958 convention declares that coastal nations may make and enforce laws
denying fishing rights to foreign vessels in the territorial sea and that violation of those laws
makes passage of the fishing vessels non-innocent. Id. art. 14, § 5. In addition, there is the
generally recognized right of coastal nations to make and enforce, as against foreign vessels
in their territorial waters, laws governing security, customs duties, fiscal regulation, and
sanitation and health matters. Nations also have the right to exclude foreign vessels from the
trade along their coast. See, e.g., United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 35 (1947); I.
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (2d ed. 1973).
112. Ulman, supra note 104.
113. TOVALOP stands for Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning Liability
for Oil Pollution, to which owners of 99% of the non-Communist world tonnage are parties.
Each tanker owner party to TOVALOP has agreed either to remove spills from its tankers or
to reimburse a national government or its agent for costs reasonably incurred in removing
such spills, if the spills are negligently caused and threaten to damage coastlines. See
generally, Becker, A Short Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and CRISTAL, 5 J. MAR.
L. & Comt. 609 (1974).
114. CRISTAL stands for Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability
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pensation schemes for meeting claims arising from oil spillage, or international conventions relating to liability for spillage" 5 cannot serve as
functional substitutes for before-the-fact regulatory control. International
regulatory control might be the ideal answer, but it is difficult to imagine
such control as incorporating little more than the lowest common denominator of its signatories.
The environmental concern, moreover, raises the more fundamental
issue of which nation's law should govern a particular vessel. "Flags of
convenience," as Liberian and Panamanian registration are frequently
termed, re selected not because of any substantial connection with the
nation of documentation, such as regular operation within its territorial
waters, but in order to be subject to minimal regulation and secure
maximum tax benefits." 6 Consequently, in addition to implicating environmental and safety concerns, unjustified foreign flag documentation
frustrates United States tax policy. Not only may a vessel escape United
States taxation on its operations, but foreign documentation may facilitate transfer pricing arrangements whereby income from other operations
properly taxable by the United States is converted into an expense owing
to, and thus income earned by, the nontaxable transportation operations
conducted under foreign flags. In light of the lack of nexus between the
flag nation and the ownership or operations of the vessel, foreign documentation of vessels controlled by United States citizens must be based
simply upon the principle that the owners of vessels are free to select a
for Oil Pollution, to which over 90% of the world's oil companies receiving cargoes of crude
and fuel oil are parties. Each company party to CRISTAL has agreed to contribute to a fund
maintained by the Oil Companies Institute for Marine Pollution Compensation Limited.
Payments are made out of the fund to reimburse clean-up expenses incurred by tanker
owners and to compensate persons sustaining damage from tanker oil spills who would
otherwise be inadequately compensated. See generally Becker, supra note 113.
115. E.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29,
1969, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970).
116. The motivation for and process of documentation in Liberia are described in a series
of three articles by J. Kifner in the following issues of the New York Times: Feb. 13, 1977,
at 1, col. 5; Feb. 14, 1977, at 14, col. 1; Feb. 15, 1977, at 10, col. 3. Kifner describes how the
Liberian fleet was originally established by American businessmen with the aid of Edward
R. Stettinius, Jr., a former Secretary of State, and how it is still controlled from offices at
103 Park Avenue in New York City. A call to those offices "can connect a caller to: Captain
Alister Crombie, Deputy Commissioner for Maritime Affairs" of Liberia; the executive
director of a 62 member association of owners of vessels registered in Liberia; an admiralty
lawyer who is chief adviser to the Liberian Maritime Bureau and Liberia's most important
representative at international shipping conferences; and an individual who plays the dual
role of "senior deputy commissioner for maritime affairs. . . [and] senior vice president of
the International Bank of Washington, which owns the International Trust of Liberia, which
in turn operates the maritime system." N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1977, at 14, col. 6. As Kifner
reports, none of these persons is Liberian. Kifner describes the benefits of Liberian
documentation as including a guarantee of anonymity for shareholders and lower crew
wages.
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flag ship of their choice. When, however, the investment decision affects
public interests such as environmental protection, freedom of choice can
hardly serve as a justification for undermining those interests. It may be
argued that the fact that American law does not prohibit United States
citizens from establishing Panamanian or Liberian business enterprises to
document vessels under those flags evidences a public policy or indifference as to having such vessels within our merchant marine. That argument, however, fails to distinguish between the lawfulness of particular
conduct-and Panamanian or Liberian registration is lawful-and the
conformity of that conduct with public policy. Analogously, American
law commonly does give investors a choice of policies in certain substantive fields-choice of business form and the content of that form' 7-- and
increasingly allows contracting parties to choose a particular source of
law to be applied in interpreting their contracts,US but in both cases the
law permits such freedom of choice largely because and only when there
is no reason to deny choice.
In sum, perhaps the most compelling reason for a United States merchant marine is that it fosters American regulation of the ownership and
operation of vessels that affect United States interests more than the
interests of any other nation. Those interests are obviously greater in the
domestic trade than in the foreign trade. It is, therefore, in the domestic
trade that inclusion of vessels in the merchant marine is most desirable
and appropriate. In contrast, including vessels operating in the United
States foreign trade in the merchant marine seems less normative." 9
117. For example, a group of ten or less persons operating a business may decide to
operate as, inter alia, a partnership, a limited partnership, a corporation, or a Subchapter S

corporation with a different combination of law (tax and otherwise) applicable to each form.
Compare, for example, the law applicable to partnerships (see generally the Uniform

Partnership Act and Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 701-61) with the law governing
Subchapter S corporations (see generally a state corporation statute, such as the Delaware
General Corporate Law and Internal Revenue Code of 1954, §§ 1371-79).

118. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 332a, (Tent. Draft
No. 6, 1960) provides: "The validity of a contract is determined by the local law of the state

chosen by the parties for this purpose, unless (a) the choice of law was obtained by unfair
means or was the result of mistake, or (b)the contract has no substantial relationship with
the chosen state and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or (c)
application of the chosen law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state which
would be the state of the governing law in the absence of an effective choice by the parties."
If the question of documentation were simply a contract matter and if the Restatement were

controlling law, both subsections (b) and (c) would preclude Liberian or Panamanian
registry. Documentation, in fact, generally implicates the state and, therefore, public policy

much more than a private contract would.
119. Troubling questions remain with respect to the foreign trade, such as whether

inclusion would be voluntary or mandatory, and if the latter, whether mandatory inclusion
would extend only to vessels owned directly or indirectly by United States citizens or also to
those owned by aliens. The next part of this Article considers some of these questions. See
text accompanying note 189 infra.
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Moreover, absent the requirement that all vessels operating in the United
States foreign trade be part of the merchant marine regardless of ownership-an unlikely prospect-some foreign flag vessels will always operate in the United States foreign trade. Thus, like other suggested approaches to environmental concerns, inclusion in the merchant marine
can never be the exclusive solution to safeguarding all United States
regulatory interests. Nevertheless, if regulation attending United States
documentation most practicably safeguards United States interests, especially environmental and safety interests, and if the United States merchant marine includes an appreciable number of vessels, inclusion in the
fleet will at least advance those interests.
II
RELATIONSHIP OF THE INVESTMENT RESTRAINTS TO THE
CASE FOR THE MERCHANT MARINE
The political reality that our merchant marine is protected from competition despite resultant economic inefficiencies indicates that it still
furthers certain interests. The primary interests which a United States
merchant marine is intended to serve, however, have subtly shifted from
national defense and foreign trade to jobs for United States seamen and
environmental and safety regulation. Were no interests still served by a
United States merchant marine, the issue of investment restraints could
be simply addressed: because the ultimate objective of the restraintsgrowth of a merchant marine-would be outdated, the restraints would be
unnecessary. However, given that a continued merchant marine does
further certain objectives, two questions arise. First, has the statutory
scheme in fact fostered a United States merchant marine? And second, in
what way do the investment restraints relate to the present interests
which justify a merchant marine?
The basic assumption underlying the legislative scheme is that cabotage
and like restraints do in fact foster the merchant marine and related
industries such as shipbuilding. Table 2 shows the sizes of the world and
United States fleets in certain years, giving figures first for vessels of
1,000 gross tons and over and then for vessels of 100 gross tons and over.
As the table illustrates, whereas the worldwide gross tonnage of all
vessels in excess of 1,000 gross tons increased approximately fivefold
during the forty year period between 1935 and 1974, American tonnage
was approximately equal in 1974 to what it had been in 1935. The percentage of world tonnage under the United States flag has dramatically
decreased from 22.9 percent in 1935 to 4.6 percent in 1974. Only temporary increases reflecting World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnamese conflict interrupt this pattern. Moreover, the fleet that does exist
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is quite dated. One naval officer reported in 1969 that the average age of

the fleet was twenty-two years and that 80 percent of the fleet dated from
World War II and was obsolete. 12 In 1971, it was estimated that twoTABLE

2.-Size of world and United States fleets

World
year

United States

number of gross tons number of gross tons
U.S. % of. U.S. % of
vessels
(in thouands)
vessels
(in thousands) world fleet world tonnage

1974

1000 GT and
overa
22,449

311,323

922

14,429

4.1

4.6

1970
1966

19,980
18,423

227,490
171,130

1,579
2,278

18,463
20,797

7.9
12.4

8.1
12.2

1960

17,317

129,770

2,926

27,333

16.9

21.1

1955
1950

15,148
13,282

100,569
84,583

3,215
3,401

28,918
29,802

21.2
25.6

28.8
35.2

1949
1939

12,868
12,798

82,571
68,509

3,421
1,379

30,070
13,814

26.6
10.8

36.4
20.2

1935

63,727

14,625

22.9

1974

100 GT and
b
over
58,957

310,934

3,566

14,337

.6

1970

50,472

227,138

2,822

18,423

5.6

8.1

1965
1960

39,628
34,056

159,979
129,339

3,224
3,845

21,478
24,781

8.1
11.3

13.4
19.2

1955

29,967

100,069

4,225

26,343

14.1

26.3

1950

27,922

83,996

4,531

27,404

16.2

32.6

4.6

a. Statistics derived from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 604 (1975) (number of vessels 1970-74);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES: 1968, at 589 (1968) (number of vessels 1966); B. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE,
14-18, Table 1 (1962) (number of vessels 1939-60); STATISTICAL OFFICE, U.N. DEP'T OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 26 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 1974, at 442 (1975) (gross
tonnage 1974, 1970, 1966); STATISTICAL OFFICE, U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
AFFAIRS, 13 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 1961, at 346 (1961) (gross tonnage 1960); STATISTICAL
OFFICE, U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, 8 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 1956, at
339 (1956) (gross tonnage 1955, 1950); STATISTICAL OFFICE, U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMIC
AFFAIRS, 2 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK: 1949-50, at 302 (1950) (gross tonnage 1935, 1939, 1949).
These statistics exclude .nonself-propelled vessels and sailing vessels.
b. Statistics derived from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 603 (1975). The figures exclude
sailing vessels, nonself-propelled craft and wooden ships.

120. Powell, United States Shipping Industry---Prblemsand Prospects,NAVAL WAR C.
REV., Nov. 1969, at 5, 6. See also Ramage, supra note 28, at 8 (estimating that of the 981
vessels in the United States merchant marine fleet as of January 1, 1969, 670 vessels were
twenty or more years old).
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thirds of the United States merchant marine fleet was twenty-five years

old. 121
Similarly, the output of United States shipbuilders has been a significant part of world shipbuilding only during war years. In 1945, for
example, United States shipyards built 80 percent of the world's pro22
duction of vessel tonnage, whereas in 1946 that figure fell to 25 percent. '
As Table 3 illustrates, that percentage has remained below 5 percent since
1955.
The conclusions to be drawn from these statistics can obviously vary.
Witnessing the decline of the United States merchant marine and United
States shipbuilding in both absolute terms and relative to other nations,
certain advocates in favor of our merchant marine have contended that a
greater degree of protection should be afforded the American merchant
marine and the shipbuilding industry.1 23 The assumption underlying this
argument is that without the present restraints and preferences, the statistics would be even more dismal. Another approach-in my judgment,
the more fruitful-is to ask whether any of the restraints designed to
protect the maritime industries have in fact contributed to its decline, and
if so, whether the interests now served by the merchant marine would be
aided or harmed by revising those restraints. Restraints that merit reconTABLE 3.-Merchant vessels over 100 gross tons completed in
the world and the United Statesa
World

year

United States

vessels gross tons vessels gross tons
completed (1000 GT) completed (1000 GT)

U.S. completed
vessels as %
of world total

U.S. tonnage
as % of
world total

1974
1970

2,949
2,814

33,541
20,980

233
156

733
375

7.9
5.5

2.2
1.8

1965
1960
1955

2,202
2,005
1,355

11,763
8,382
4,965

116
49
21

218
379
100

5.3
2.4
1.5

1.9
4.5
2.0

1950

930

3,250

29

393

3.1

12.1

a. Statistics derived from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 603 (1975). Table excludes sailing ships,
nonself-propelled craft and wooden ships.

121. Blackwell, Implementation of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 5 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 167, 167 (1974).
122. W. GORTER, UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICY 5 (1956).

123. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 18, 1977, at A13.
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sideration are: the restrictions on foreign investment in United States
carriers engaged in the domestic trade; the controls on the transfer of
vessels to aliens; and the ownership requirements which must be met to
be eligible for operating and construction subsidies.
A.

INVESTMENT RESTRAINTS IN UNITED STATES DOMESTIC TRADE

Section 27 of the Jones Act,124 sets forth three primary prerequisites for
engaging in the domestic cargo trade: the documentation, construction,
and ownership requirements. Where a corporation owns the vessel, there
is also a management requirement.
The documentation requirement, which prohibits all but United States
flag vessels from engaging in domestic trade, is patently anticompetitive.
Yet the present interests served by a United States merchant marine do
support its retention. A policy in favor of protecting the jobs of American
seamen has been recognized, even though compensation could be provided to persons losing jobs because of foreign competition. Further,
given that American wage rates would almost certainly apply to vessels
regularly operating in our domestic trade, it is difficult to envision any
substantial cost savings emanating from the operation of foreign flag
vessels in United States waters. Such vessels should also be subject to
other policies reflected in our domestic laws; requiring documentation
under United States law facilitates conformity to those policies. Finally,
at some point it would be specious not to designate as American, a vessel
that regularly engages in the United States domestic trade and is subject
to United States regulation.
The documentation requirement receives support from the construction requirement as well. Analytically, the construction requirement,
which specifies that vessels engaging in'the domestic trade must be built
in the United States,'2 differs from the documentation and ownership
124. 46 U.S.C. § 883 (Supp. V 1975).
125. Determining whether the construction requirement has been satisfied may not be

easy. For example, various parts of a vessel may have been manufactured in different
countries or a vessel may have been originally built in one country but repaired or rebuilt

elsewhere. A 1956 amendment to § 27 clarified, in part, tome of these problems:
[N]o vessel of more than five hundred gross tons which has acquired the lawful right
to engage in the coastwise trade, by virtue of having been built in or documented
under the laws of the United States, and which has later been rebuilt shall have the
right thereafter to engage in the coastwise trade, unless the entire rebuilding, includ-

ing the construction of any major components of the hull or superstructure of the
vessel, is effected within the United States, its territories (not including trust territories), or its possessions . . ..

Act of July 14, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-714, § 1, 70 Stat. 544 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 883
(1970)). This amendment, which relates to reconstruction, is interpreted as applying to initial

construction as well. Interview with Samuel Nemerow, Counsel, Maritime Administration,
Washington, D.C. (Dec. 11, 1975).
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requirements. In itself, the construction requirement neither bars alien
investment in the construction industry 2 6 nor operations by aliens as
domestic carriers, although it might negatively affect the possibility of a
foreign carrier competing in the domestic trade because of the likelihood
that most of its fleet would have been built outside the United States.' 27
Some of the same policy arguments, however, that are used consistently
if not persuasively to support a United States merchant marine apply
more forcefully to vessel construction. Consider defense preparedness,
for example. The same shipyard that constructs vessels for the private
domestic trade produces vessels for the Navy; 12 8 during a war these
facilities could be altered to provide greater military production. Further,
as of 1976, a total of 97,154 workers were employed in the domestic ship
construction industry. 29 Subsidizing displacement from these jobs could
be more difficult than subsidizing loss of jobs for the smaller number of
merchant seamen. If the construction requirement does foster certain
interests which counsel for its continuation or, at least, for a slow rather
than rapid demise, then it seems appropriate to consider amendments to
section 27's other prerequisites in light of that conclusion. Politically it
might be more difficult to continue the construction requirement without
maintaining the documentation requirement. Could we insist that foreign
flag vessels operating in our domestic trade be constructed in the United
States? If so, the carrot we would be offering would pale beside the stick
retained.
The same interests do not justify the ownership or management requirements. Section 27 requires the individual owner to be a citizen and,
by reference to section 2 of the Shipping Act, the corporate owner to be
domestically organized and owned, to the extent of 75 percent of the
ownership interests, by United States citizens. 3 The same ownership
interest requirement applies to partnerships. '3' In addition, the chief
executive officer and the chairman of the board of a corporate owner
must be United States citizens and the number of alien directors, if any,
must be less than a quorum of the board.' 32
126. Section 37 of the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 835 (1970), does require administrative
approval for foreign direct investment in the vessel construction industry. For a description
of this provision and a discussion of the problems associated with it, see Phillips, supra note
1, at 901-05.
127. Although a few vessels were constructed in the United States for foreign owners or
foreign registry during the 1950's, no ships were build domestically for foreign registry
between 1959 and 1970. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 51.
128. For example, General Dynamics Corporation's Quincy shipbuilding division repairs
both commercial and naval vessels. 38, No. 15 STANDARD AND POOR'S CORP., STANDARD
CORPORATE DESCRIPTIONS 5678 (Aug. 1977).
129. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION, supra note 97, at 78.
130. 46 U.S.C. § 802(a) (1970). The text of § 2 is set forth at supra note 6.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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Jobs for seamen, environmental protection, safety, and other regulatory concerns are served by easing the flow of funds into the merchant
marine, yet the ownership requirement counteracts that objective. By
directly limiting the use of foreign capital and thereby decreasing the

supply of funds, the restrictions may raise the cost of the capital which is
available.

33

In addition, the investment restraints prohibit the entry of

new foreign competitors into the field. To the extent that inability to
34
assume direct control over the operations discourages investment, the
management requirement may be criticized on the same ground. In short,
the investment restraints might well be prohibiting more vessels from
coming under the effective regulation of the United States and decreasing
the number of jobs Which might be available to American seamen. Nor is
there reason to believe that aliens would not invest funds in the domestic
trade; in fact, such investment is now considered quite attractive.'13 Even
if American investors did not consider the investment desirable, foreign
investors might find it attractive. 3 6 Interestingly, eliminating the citizen
ownership and management requirements would substantially obviate the

anticompetitive nature of section 27. Foreign investors would not be
barred from competing off our shores. Rather they would simply be told
133. Indeed, this appears to be the premise underlying the Ship Mortgage Act. See note
17 supra.
134. It is a common assumption in the business community that a classified board tends to
discourage takeover attempts for the same reason-purchase of the controlling block of
stock will not result, at least for some time, in actual control. On the other hand, takeovers
tend to be more hostile encounters than other investment situations, and management might
be more attentive to the wishes of controlling stockholders in non-takeover investment
situations, regardless of the difference in citizenship between the directors and the controlling shareholders. Certainly, persons holding a controlling block of stock would be able to
assume control no later than the next annual meeting by electing dummy directors of
American citizenship. Still, control over the corporation by the foreign investors owning
less than 100% of the stock will always be somewhat incomplete because of the duties the
directors owe to the other shareholders to manage the corporation for the benefit of all
shareholders. Foreign investors who assumed "direct" rather than "indirect" control over
the investment by becoming the directors would, of course, be subject to this same duty, but
could, in the short run, implement their policies regardless of whether any duties were
violated in so doing. Moreover, the foreign investor as director may not be as vulnerable as
American directors to suits by stockholders since enforcing a judgment against a foreign
director could be quite difficult.
135. See Marcial, Shipping Stocks Outpace Market as Demand for Tankers is Seen
Surging in Years Ahead, Wall St. J., Feb. 15, 1977, at 45, col. 3; Williams, Alaska Oil Stirs
Hope for U.S. Tanker Fleet, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1977, at 31, col. 1.
136. Examples of seemingly unprofitable investments by foreign investors include Iran's
investment in Fried. Krupp G.m.b.H., a major West German concern, and Libya's investment in Fiat, the Italian auto manufacturer. Investment motivation is complex. Domestic
and foreign investors may give different weight to various factors. One factor the foreign
investor might weigh more heavily than his domestic counterpart in making an investment
decision is the prestige of controlling a visible business enterprise in a different, more
industrialized country.
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that when in America, do as the Americans do-sail your vessels under
the United States flag subject to the full regulation of American laws.
To understand the full impact of the investment restraints on economic
activity in the United States, one must also bear in mind that aliens who
invest in domestic enterprises unrelated to the maritime industries generally Must arrange the business so that all water cargo transportation is
handled by carriers rather than the business directly. Where the business
itself could handle the carriage most efficiently, the cost of transport is
increased and the potential profitability of the enterprise decreased. Thus
the present restraint might be an indirect impediment to foreign investment in other industries. In 1958 Congress recognized but failed to fully
rectify the spill-over effect of the cabotage restraints by adding section
27A to the Jones Act. 137 Section 27A permits self-carriage of cargo or
passengers by certain corporations engaged in manufacturing or the exploitation of natural resources in the United States. But to qualify under
section 27A, the corporation must be domestically organized, must be
engaged primarily in manufacturing or mineral extraction in the United
States, and must purchase or produce in the United States not less than 75
percent of the raw materials used or sold in its operations. In addition, a
majority of its officers and 90 percent of its employees must be United
States residents and the total book value of the vessels cannot exceed 10
percent of the aggregate book value of its assets. American-built vessels
owned by a corporation so qualifying, if nonself-propelled or, if selfpropelled and less than 500 gross tons, "shall be entitled to documentation under the laws of the United States, and . . . shall be entitled to
engage in the coastwise trade and, together with their owners or masters,
shall be entitled to all the other benefits and privileges and shall be subject
to the same requirements, penalties, and forfeitures as may be applicable" to vessels documented under other provisions.138 Even the breadth
of this language is somewhat misleading, however. With respect to carriage between the United States, the statute confines the vessels' uses to:
(1) the transportation of persons or merchandise either for the corporate
owner or a parent or subsidiary of the corporate owner; or (2) charter to a
common or contract carrier for use in "the domestic noncontiguous
trade" if that carrier qualifies as a citizen under the Shipping Act's
definition of citizenship and charters the vessels at prevailing rates. 139 Yet
the utility of the vessels for such operations is limited. The requirement
that the vessels be either nonself-propelled or carry under 500 gross tons
and the legislative history of section 27A make clear that deep-sea craft
137.
(1958),
138.
139.

46 U.S.C. § 883-1 (1970). See generally S. REP. No. 2145, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
reprintedin [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5190.
46 U.S.C. § 883-1 (1970).
Id.
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may not be documented and operated under this section. The Senate
Report, prepared by the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, declared that "the legislation would have been rejected had it
applied to deep-sea craft." 40 The Committee stated, "We are determined
that the present requirement of law that our deep-sea fleet engaged in the
coastwise and intercoastal trade be owned by citizens of the United
States remain unchanged." 1 41 Section 27A, therefore, incorporates its
own arbitrary limitations and, not coincidentally, has rarely if ever been
utilized.
Because most cargo vessels are owned by corporations rather than
individuals, the investment limitations applicable to corporate owners of
vessels are especially important. Focusing on the problem of corporate
ownership reveals three additional indictments against the restraints on
investment in the domestic trade as presently drafted: the 75 percent
investment limitation is ambiguous and therefore offers inadequate guidance to investors; it probably does no more than incorporate the same
standard as the "controlling interest" standard applicable to other situations under the Shipping Act; and if the two standards do make a difference, the difference is misplaced in view of their national security foundation.
Section 2 of the Shipping Act, which defines corporate citizenship,
states that the 75 percent ownership requirement is not met:
(a) if the title to 75 per centum of its stock is not vested in such citizens
free from any trust or fiduciary obligation in favor of any person not a

citizen of the United States; or (b) if 75 per centum of the voting power in
such corporation is not vested in citizens of the United States; or (c) if,
through any contract or understanding, it is so arranged that more than 25
per centum of the voting power in such corporation may be exercised,

directly or indirectly, in behalf of any person who is not a citizen of the
United States; or (d) if by any other means whatsoever control of any

interest in the corporation in excess of 25 per centum is conferred upon or
permitted to be exercised by any person who is not a citizen of the United
States. 142

This "clarification" of the 75 percent ownership requirement raises more
questions than it answers. Professor Vagts has pointed out that even if
foreign interests own 25 percent or less of the common stock, "the 75
percent of the common would certainly owe some fiduciary duties to the
25 percent.' ' 43 The same concept of a fiduciary duty towards minority
stockholders was recently given as one reason for denying relief to an
140. S. REP. No. 2145, supra note 137 at 4.

141. Id.
142. 46 U.S.C. § 802(c) (1970).
143. Vagts, The CorporateAlien: DefinitionalQuestions in FederalRestraints on Foreign
Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1541 (1961).
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American management which sought to enjoin a foreign takeover of their
company which left American stockholders in the minority. 144 To the
court, if the obligations owed to the American minority stockholders were
breached, such stockholders would simply have "a well recognized remedy. . . in the form of a shareholders derivative action."' 145 In short, that
literal statutory proscription cannot be squared with commonly accepted
precepts of American corporate law. If, on the other hand, what is meant
is not fiduciary duties in a broad common law sense, but something more
formal and akin to a trust-"trust" being the noun which precedes the
phrase "fiduciary obligation"- either enumeration (a) or enumeration
(c), which speaks of "any contract or understanding," is superfluous.
Such superfluity seems probable since one can hardly read section 2146
without feeling that each clause has been said before; if nothing else,.-this
repetition emphasizes the degree to which any sort of foreign control was
meant to be proscribed. But whether the proscribed "fiduciary obligation" is formal or informal, the content of that fiduciary obligation must
still be reconciled with the obligations which all stockholders are owed.
Thus the only sensible interpretation of that obscure phrase is that no
fiduciary obligation is owed toward the foreign interests which exceeds
47
those ordinarily owed to minority stockholders in a similar position.1
It is equally unclear whether the supposed distinction between the
definition of corporate citizen for purposes of the domestic trade-the 75
percent stockholding requirement-and section 2's definition of corporate citizenship for purposes other than the domestic trade-phrased
variously as "the controlling interest therein," "a majority of the stock
thereof," and "the majority of the voting power"'is of any real
significance. Both definitions would deny corporate citizenship where
foreign investors own more than 50 percent of the stock. Both definitions
would also seem to preclude corporate citizenship where foreign investors own 25 percent or less of the stock of the corporate carrier but
nevertheless control it. That not atypical situation frequently results from
the ownership of a large block of stock in an otherwise widely held
corporation, but it could also result from the possession of substantial
debt-holdings or from other nonequity relationships.1 49
The two tests of corporate citizenship should preclude citizenship
144. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 418 (S.D. Tex.
1973).

145. Id. But see Phillips, supra note 1,at 873 (noting the probable ineffectiveness of this
remedy).
146. See note 6 supra for the complete text of § 2.
147. Professor Vagts seems to concur in this judgment. See Vagts, supra note 143, at
1541.

148. 46 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1970).
149. See Phillips, supra note 1, at 849 n.33.
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where the foreign investors control the carrier despite owning 25 percent
or less of the stock because the essence of both definitions is control, not
merely the percentage of the stock owned. Ironically, it is easier to
conclude that the less restrictive definition focuses on control regardless
of the percentage of stock owned. Section 2(b), which clarifies the definition of the "controlling interest" standard, states that "[t]he controlling
interest in a corporation shall not be deemed to be owned by citizens of
the United States

. .

.if by any other means whatsoever control of the

corporation is conferred upon or permitted to be exercised by any person
who is not a citizen of the United States." 50 Thus to satisfy the definition
of corporate citizenship for nondomestic trade purposes, United States
citizens must not only own the relevant percentage of stock, but also
control the exercise of that stock. If this statutory language is to be given
weight, control over the corporation traceable to control over the proxy
machinery and other apparatus available to a dominant group, even one
comprised of less than majority or 25 percent stockholding, must be
considered an exercise of control over interests far in excess of the stated
ownership interest. The court in Meacham Corp. v. United States 5' so
held.
150. 46 U.S.C. § 802(b) (1970).
151. 207 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. dismissed, 348 U.S. 801 (1954). The Meacham
case involved an analysis of the interrelationships between at least five corporations.
American Overseas Tanker Corporation (Overseas), a United States citizen, had rights to
purchase three surplus vessels under United States registry from the United States Maritime
Commission, but the provisions of a loan agreement under which Overseas had purchased
other vessels prohibited Overseas from doing so. On the other hand, the Chinese Petroleum
Corporation (Petroleum), a Nationalist Chinese corporation, was in need of such vessels to
transport Persian Gulf oil to Formosa but was unable to purchase them because it was not a
United States citizen. To enable Petroleum to utilize the vessels to which Overseas had
rights, two other corporations were formed. The principals of Overseas formed the National
Tanker Corporation (National) to purchase the vessels. Certain Chinese businessmen who
represented the Chinese Trading and Industrial Development Corporation (Trading), on
behalf of Petroleum, caused United Tanker Corporation (United) to be organized as a
domestic corporation. United was pivotal in the transaction. United loaned National the
money to purchase the three vessels; National, which performed no other function,
bareboat chartered the vessels to United for 10 years; United chartered the vessels for a
shorter period to Trading, which in turn chartered the vessels to Petroleum. The case
concerned the claim that the Meacham, one of the three vessels involved, was subject to
forfeiture by the United States on the ground that United was not a United States citizen for
purposes of § 2 of the Shipping Act, and, therefore, the transfer of the Meacham to United
violated § 9 of the Shipping Act. See notes 159-80 infra and accompanying text. In
recognition of the corporate citizenship requirement, the attorneys who structured the
transaction and caused United to be incorporated provided United with two classes of
stock. The equity capital investment by the Chinese businessmen in United, which totaled
$2000, was in the form of Class A stock. The holders of Class A stock had no voting rights
but were entitled to 90% of the earnings and, upon liquidation, 90% of the assets as well as
their initial cash contribution. The voting stock consisted of Class B stock, which was
entirely owned by Americans. Although the number of issued and outstanding shares of
Class B stock equaled the number of shares of Class A stock, a low par value for Class B
stock resulted in a total initial paid-in capital for this class of only $3.00. The Chinese-also
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Neither the case law nor section 2 fully explains the domestic trade
stockholding requirement. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that the domestic trade definition of corporate citizenship bars control exercised through
the ownership of any interest, even less than 25 percent of the stock. The
Jones Act added the 75 percent stockholding requirement and subsection
(c) interpreting that requirement to the Shipping Act in order to
strengthen the prior definition of corporate citizenship. 52 That definition's stress on the exercise of control regardless of ownership interest
helps clarify the statement in subsection (c) that the 75 percent test is not
met "if by any . . .means whatsoever control of any interest in the
corporation in excess of 25 per centum is conferred upon or permitted to
53
be exercised by any person who is not a citizen of the United States.'
In short, like the statutory definition applicable to nondomestic trade
situations, control over the management of the corporation by any dominant group through their control of the proxy machinery probably constitutes an exercise of control over interests in excess of their actual holdings. This conclusion is supported by the Jones Act's goals of supplementing naval vessels and expanding foreign trade that relate not only to
operational decisions concerning movement and control over vessels in
times of emergency, but also to managerial decisions over the business
policies of the corporate owner. The management requirement lends
additional support to the notion that managerial decisions are to be
"American." This notion is incompatible with foreign control exercised
in any manner, regardless of the percentage of stock held by aliens.
Any difference between the two definitions must lie where the foreign
investors own in excess of 25 percent but not a majority of the stock
interest. If the foreign investors control the corporate carrier, the corporation will not qualify for citizenship under the nondomestic trade definition because, as previously stated, that definition concentrates on control. In the same situation, the corporation would not qualify for citizenship to engage in the domestic trade on two grounds: the foreign stockholding exceeds 25 percent, and foreign investors control the corporation.
In other words, the domestic trade definition constitutes an irrebuttable
provided the remainder of United's funds which consisted of loans totaling several million
dollars and capital which stemmed from Petroleum. The board of directors consisted of
three American stockholders; one of the American directors served as president and a
second as vice-president. A Chinese alien was elected secretary and treasurer. United's
offices adjoined Trading's offices. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, per Judge
Soper, affirmed the district court decision upholding the forfeiture to the government, based
on United's lack of citizenship. The court emphasized that although Americans had "titular

control" over the enterprise, that control was exercised "in the interests of their Chinese
associates." 207 F.2d at 543.
152. See Vagts, supra note 143, at 1505-06.
153. 46 U.S.C. § 802(c), (d) (1970).
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presumption that investors owning over 25 percent of the stock control
the corporation, thereby dispensing with the more difficult task of proving control. The difficulty of proving control when the stockholdings
exceed 25 percent seems a rather thin reed to support a stockholding
requirement that differs from the requirement applicable in related investment situations. Where foreign investors do not control the corporate
carrier despite their ownership of over 25 percent of the stock-a rare
situation, likely to arise only if the foreign holdings are diffuse-the
definitions do make a difference. The corporation may buy a vessel
without administrative approval and is eligible for subsidies, but cannot
engage in the domestic trade. But if foreign interests do not control the
corporate carrier, why not allow the carrier to engage in the latter as well
as purchase vessels and receive subsidies? Two arguments for retaining
the extra contraceptive in the United States domestic trade could be
made, the first relating to the critical nature of the domestic trade and the
second to the nature of the subject matter, vessels on water. Both arguments depend primarily upon the dubious assumption that the principal
interest served by the merchant marine is national defense.
To sustain the 75 percent citizen stockholding requirement for the
domestic trade-in contrast to a 50 percent citizen stockholding requirement for vessel transfers and other activities, and no citizen stockholding
requirement for United States flag carriers in the foreign trade-one
must seemingly adopt the premise that the closer the vessel in which an
alien has invested operates to American shores, the more the national
security is endangered. However, unless the 1920's notion of a naval
vessel as a merchant marine vessel with a gun quickly slipped into place is
accepted, the argument is specious. In any genuine conflict, the most
important internal transport mechanisms will probably be trucking and
the railroads. In fact, civil defense emergency planning places as much
emphasis on trucking and railroad services as it does on the use of the
merchant marine. 154 Yet neither of these transport industries has investment restraints comparable to those applied to the domestic merchant
marine.
The second argument relates to the nature of the vessel itself. A vessel
is movable and, unlike trucks and railroads, can easily be removed from
our shores in time of emergency. Initially this argument overlooks the
154. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, STANDBY ORDER No. DOT

1940.4,

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES FOR THE CONTROL OF CIVIL TRANSPORTATION (1970);
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, EMERGENCY PLANNING AND OPERATIONS MANUAL
(1971); INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, TITLE 32A NATIONAL DEFENSE, APPENDIX,
CHAPTER VIII, GENERAL TRANSPORT MOBILIZATION ORDERS (1971); DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, et al., GUIDELINES FOR THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY IN A NATIONAL EMERGENCY

(1974).
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existence of the Merchant Seaman Act and other legislation which, even
were the investment restraint removed or modified, would require that all
officers and 75 percent of the crew be United States citizens.' It is
doubtful that such a crew faced with conflicting directives from the
nearby United States military and from a distant foreign owner,
stockholder, or partner would obey the commands of the latter. In any
event, if this is the concern, the ownership percentages are reversed; the
greatest degree of United States ownership should be required for operation in the foreign trade and for vessel transfers. The risks of not servicing the United States or disobeying a requisition order are infinitely
greater for vessels engaged in the foreign trade, but those vessels need
not be owned by a corporation with any stockholders who qualify for
United States citizenship to be included in the United States flag fleet.' 56
As to the vessels-the ultimate object of control-the definition of corporate citizenship for vessel transfers is only 50 percent ownership by
United States citizens; yet, the act of transfer would seem to present a
greater danger than the indirect threat of transfer.
Thus the ownership and management requirements that limit investment in the domestic trade not only lack clarity but also are inconsistent
with both past policies and present interests. If the interests a United
States merchant marine presently serves were permitted to control inclusion and exclusion from that fleet, vessel owners would be encouraged to
document their vessels under the United States flag or, in the least, not be
hindered from doing so, with one possible exception-the United States
itself should not participate in the deception effected by flags of convenience that allow the nature and operations of vessels to escape the public
policies of the nation whose interests in such vessels is greatest. However, because the United States has a legitimate interest in regulating vessels that come into American waters, few vessels are inappropriate foci
for the application of American law. Certainly with respect to vessels
regularly operating in the United States domestic trade, the requisite
connection with the United States exists to subject the nature and operations of the vessels to American law regardless of the citizenship of their
57
owners or managers.
B.

TRANSFER RESTRAINTS

A large percentage of Liberian and Panamanian flag vessels engaged in
the United States foreign trade are owned directly or indirectly by United
States citizens. The most commonly cited reason for registration in
155. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
156. See text at note I I supra.
157. See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
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Liberia or Panama rather than the United States is the higher cost of
American labor. 58 Any one explanation, however, probably oversimplifies the documentation pattern. For example, the wage differential
explanation alone seems insufficient in light of the operating subsidies
available to United States flag carriers. Regardless of whether one accepts the lower cost of foreign labor as the predominant reason for
documentation elsewhere, the present interests implicated by a United
States merchant marine are best served by identifying and reexamining
any additional reasons that might contribute to foreign documentation.
One such factor is the transfer restraints on the disposition of the vessel.
Sections 9 and 37 of the Shipping Act 59 both require approval by the
Secretary of Commerce for the transfer to an alien, or change in registration, of any United States flag vessel owned by an American citizen. The
restriction applies to direct transfers, such as outright sales, and to
indirect transfers, such as mortgaging. Both sections also limit not only
transfer of the entire vessel, but "any interest therein."
Despite these similarities, sections 9 and 37 differ in a number of
respects. On the one hand, because section 37 was added to the Shipping
Act in 1918 to fill gaps left by section 9,161 section 37's scope substantially
exceeds that of section 9. For example, section 37 bars the transfer of
vessels documented under United States law or owned by American
citizens regardless of registration, whereas section 9 refers only to vessels
documented under United States law.' 61 Also section 37, unlike section 9,
explicitly applies to transfers of control over corporations owning such
vessels. 62 Although it could be argued that section 9 bars such an acquisition of corporate control on the ground that it constitutes an indirect
158. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1977, at 14, col. 4.

159. 46 U.S.C. §§ 808, 835 (1970). See notes 9-16 supra and accompanying text.
160. The § 9 prohibition on sales, leases, and charters of vessels documented under the
laws of the United States did not eliminate all alien control over such vessels because of the

other possible means of acquiring such control, including control of the corporation owning
the vessel or financial arrangements with the vessel owner that vest some degree of control

in another party. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co. v. Steamship Westhampton, 358 F.2d 574,
583 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 921 (1966). Thus the § 37 provisions apply both to
the transfer of any interest in a vessel owned by a citizen of the United States wherever
documented or in a vessel documented under United States laws irrespective of ownership
and to the transfer of control over any corporation owning such vessels. The expanded
language was designed to be "so sweeping and comprehensive that no lawyer, however

ingenious, would be able to work out any device under this section to keep the letter, while
breaking the spirit of the law." 56 CONG. REc. 8029 (1918).

161. It should be noted that § 9, as enacted in 1916, restricted, during a war or national
emergency, the sale, lease, or charter to an alien of any vessel documented under the laws of

the United States or owned by any citizen of the United States. Act of Sept. 7, 1916, Pub. L.
No. 64-260, § 9, 39 Stat. 728 (1916). When § 37 was enacted, the provisions in § 9 dealing
with restrictions during times of war or national emergency were transferred and amplified.
Act of July 15, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-198, § 4, 40 Stat. 900 (1918).

162. 46 U.S.C. § 835(e) (1970).
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transfer of the vessel owned by the corporation, the court in United
States v. Niarchos6 3 held otherwise.
Section 9 is broader than section 37, however, in perhaps the most
significant respect. Section 9 applies at all times, section 37 only in states
of war or national emergency. The 1976 National Emergencies Act'1
terminated the state of emergency which had existed almost continuously
since the Korean War. 165 In accordance with section 101 (a) of that Act, 16
the powers granted the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to section 37 of
the Shipping Act will terminate on September 14, 1978. Thereafter the
Secretary's administrative powers will be limited to section 9. Thus,
approval will still be required to transfer vessels documented under the
United States flag to persons who are not American citizens, but not to
acquire a controlling interest in a United States foreign trade carrier or to
transfer a foreign flag vessel owned by an American citizen.
Should the section 9 restraints be retained, especially in light of the fact
that section 37 will be inoperative in the near future? Choosing initial
United States rather than foreign documentation now carries with it the
cost of never knowing whether the ultimate disposition of the vessel will
be restricted. The Maritime Administration's regulations, 167 which differentiate between vessels under 3,000 gross tons and those in excess of
3,000 tons, offer little guidance. As a general rule, the Maritime Administration approves the transfer of vessels under 3,000 gross tons, "provided
the vessel is not needed for reasons of national defense and provided also
that the foreign buyer and country of registry are acceptable to the
Maritime Administration."'(18 Such vessels presumptively serve little
function in the merchant marine and have little military or quasi-military
capability. In contrast, each application for transfer to foreign registry or
ownership of vessels in excess of 3,000 gross tons is "evaluated on its
individual merits."1 69 The criteria utilized by the Maritime Administration
in considering the application to transfer are spelled out in only slightly
greater detail: "(1) The type, size, speed, general condition, and age of
the vessel; (2) The acceptability of the foreign buyer and country of
163. 125 F. Supp. 214 (D.D.C. 1954). The court reasoned that Congress would not have
enacted § 37, which clearly bars such a transfer of interest, if it had not believed that § 9 did
not extend to the indirect transfer of an interest in a vessel through the transfer of control in
a corporation. Id. at 229.
164. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976).
165. Proclamation No. 4074, Aug. 17, 1971, 36 Fed. Rep. 15724 (declared to implement
currency restrictions and to enforce foreign economic controls); Proclamation No. 3972,
Mar. 24, 1970, 35 Fed. Rep. 5001 (declared because of postal workers strike); Proclamation
No. 2914, Dec. 19, 1950, 15 Fed. Rep. 9029 (declared because of the Korean War).
166. 90 Stat. 1255 (1976).
167. See generally 46 C.F.R. 33 221.4-.30 (1976).
168. Id. § 221.7 app. III.
169. Id. app. I.
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registry; and (3) The need to retain the vessel under U.S. flag or ownership for the purposes of national defense, maintenance of an adequate
merchant marine, foreign policy of the United States, and the national
interest."170
The interested investor might gain slightly greater insight about transfer
policy from administrative practice. Section 41 of the Shipping Act 17'
allows the Maritime Administration to grant its approval to the transfer
subject to certain conditions. If such conditions are imposed, the approval takes the form of a contract between the Maritime Administration and
the purchaser. 72 One standard condition in such contracts is that the
vessel be subject to requisition by the United States on the same basis as
if it were owned by a United States citizen, 73 but "[i]f the transfer of the
vessel is to the flag of a country that is a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the Administrator will consider this condition satisfied if the vessel upon request is made available to a NATO
country."' 74 This provision indicates that the foreign buyer and country
of registry will generally be more acceptable if the buyer is a national of,
and the country of registry is, an ally of the United States. In contrast,
another provision bars charters to aliens for carriage of cargoes to certain
Communist or Communist-controlled countries without the prior approval of the Maritime Administration; at least some of these countries would
therefore be unacceptable as countries of registry or the nation state of
the prospective buyer. 175
The investor might also find some comfort in the fact that historically
very few vessel transfer applications have been refused. Nevertheless,
the restraint on alienability requires the vessel owner to submit to an
administrative approval process which involves the twin costs of expense
and time and which will possibly limit the number of prospective purchasers for the vessel. The perception of these obstacles may be more
important than their statistical probability. The Court of Claims in East170. Id.
171. 46 U.S.C. § 839 (1970).

172. Kyle and O'Brien interview, supra note 88. Violation of the conditions on which
approval is granted is punishable by fine and/or imprisonment and subjects the vessel or
other subject matter involved to forfeiture. 46 U.S.C. § 839 (1970).
173. Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936,46 U.S.C. § 1242 (1970), defines the

circumstances under which the United States may requisition a vessel owned by an American citizen. See also notes 43-45 supra and accompanying text.
174. 46 C.F.R. § 221.7 app. II.A(2) (1976).

175. Id. app. II.A(3)(c). The list of countries under this provision is significantly longer
than the list applicable to the transfer of control over corporations owning vessels of less
than 65 feet. Compare id. with id. § 221.4(b), (e). Only the former list includes the Soviet
Union, a number of eastern European countries under the domination of the Soviet Union,
and Communist China. There is no apparent reason for the difference between the two lists.

44

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11:1

port Steamship Corp. v. United States,76 a 1967 case, recognized the
"broad discretion" that the Maritime Administration exercises. Thus if
the transfer is disapproved, the. broad criteria for the administrative
determination-national defense, foreign policy, commerce of the United
States, needs of the United States merchant marine-make it unlikely
that the decision of the Maritime Administration would be reviewable on
substantive grounds.
Not only do the vessel transfer restraints seem counterproductive in
terms of encouraging documentation under United States law, but their
continuation seems incongruous since investment in United States
foreign trade carriers without administrative approval will be possible
when section 37 becomes inoperative. True, unlike a vessel, if control of
a United States corporation is transferred to foreign interests, the situs of
the corporation theoretically remains domestic. Nevertheless, a change in
registry of the vessels owned by the carrier corporation might also follow
because the corporation would no longer be eligible for operating differential subsidies. And, unlike the transfer of a single vessel, transferring
the control of a carrier corporation may affect the control of a large
number of vessels.
Under certain circumstances, limited transfer restrictions may be justified. The vessel transfer restraints did serve a legitimate purpose after
World Wars I and II when the United States government disposed of
surplus vessels under section 5 of the Jones Act'" and the Sale of Surplus
War Built Vessels Act of 1946.178 These statutes gave United States
citizens a first right to purchase. The vessel transfer restraints insured
that United States citizens after purchasing such vessels would not simply
resell them to aliens, thereby indirectly avoiding the purchaserpreference provisions of the statutes. If similar surplus sales are held in
the future, prohibitions against indirect transfers of vessels to aliens
could be incorporated into the legislation authorizing the sales.
It may similarly be argued that vessels constructed with subsidies
should not be transferred to aliens.179 Construction subsidies, however,
are granted only after the recipient of the subsidy agrees to keep the
180
vessel documented under United States law for twenty-five years.
Enforcement of those agreements does not require the general transfer
restraint applicable to all United States flag vessels.
176. 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
177. 41 Stat. 990 (1920).
178. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1735-46 (1970).
179. Maritime Administration officials report that one of the chief factors taken into
consideration in deciding whether to approve a vessel transfer under sections 9 and 37 of the
Shipping Act is whether the vessel was constructed or operated with a federal subsidy. Kyle
and O'Brien interview, supra note 88.
180. 46 U.S.C. § 1153 (1970).
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CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATING SUBSIDIES

The relationship between subsidies, both construction and operating,
and the size of the United States merchant marine in the foreign trade is
more direct than the possible relationship between the transfer restraints
and the documentation of vessels by United States citizens under the
flags of other nations. The construction and operating subsidies are
essentially bribes to United States citizens to keep their vessels part of
the merchant marine. However, it is not as clear as in the case of the
transfer restraints that the citizenship requirement should be removed
and the subsidies extended to foreign citizens.
The cost of the subsidy program has been well documented. The
construction and operating differential subsidies provided to United
States carriers engaged in the foreign trade totalled approximately $5.5
billion from 1936, when the subsidy program was initiated, through
1973.181 Construction differential subsidies amounted to $1,835 million
during this period; $1,547 million of that sum was spent between 1958 and
1973.182 In 1970 the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was amended to encourage the construction of 300 new ships to replace the obsolete World War
II vessels which made up the bulk of the 1970 merchant marine fleet. 183 It
is estimated that the construction differential subsidy program for the ten
year period following the passage of the 1970 amendments will cost as
much as $6 billion.1 4 The operating differential subsidies have also been
enormous, $3.6 billion from 1936 through 1973.185 All but $226 million of
this sum was expended since the mid-1950's.18 6 The present annual cost of
the operating subsidies is $300 million.'87
Despite the cost that would be involved, the extension of these subsidies to aliens or alien-controlled corporations could be rationalized on
th& theory that the real beneficiaries of the operating subsidy are the
American seamen, and of the construction subsidy, the American shipyards. In short, the subsidies can be perceived as export subsidies,
needed to maintain a sufficient volume of work for seamen and shipyards
so that each will be available for national defense purposes. Of the two,
extension of the construction subsidy makes more sense because the
national defense justification is strongest in the context of shipyards.188
181. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 138; Kilgour, supra note 29, at 396. References are
to fiscal years.
182. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 42-43.
183. See generally Bowman, The Merchant Marine Act of 1970, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 715
(1971). In 1971 two-thirds of the 700 vessels in the active merchant marine fleet under
United States flag were about twenty-five years old. Blackwell, supra note 113.
184. G. JANTSCHER, supra note 28, at 43.
185. Id. at 30.
186. Id.
187. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
188. See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
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If the dominant interest today in maintaining a merchant marine is to
subject the maximum number of vessels to American regulation, however, that interest is not very well served by a subsidy program which has
induced only a smalf percentage of the owners of vessels engaged in the
United States foreign trade to document their ships under United States
law. Two alternative approaches are to subject foreign flag vessels coming into American waters to United States regulation 189 or to induce, by
means other than subsidies, more United States citizens to document
their vessels under the United States flag.
Although the latter approach goes beyond the scope of this Article, the
analysis I have suggested might be utilized to determine a practical
solution to this problem as well. Clearly vessels engaged primarily in the
United
foreign trade and owned directly or indirectly by American
citizens,States
corporate or individual, bear a closer relationship to
the United
States than any other country. Thus it is appropriate for American
policies-especially those related to the merchant marine-to be applied
to such vessels, and arguably the easiest and most complete way to do so
is to document the vessels under American law. Voluntary inclusion is
unrealistic absent artificial inducements such as subsidies and preferences. If voluntary inclusion is unlikely, the United States should confront directly the costs of mandatory documentation under American law.
Initially, definitional problems and enforcement difficulties come to
mind. Whereas the present definition of corporate citizenship in section 2
is exclusionary, the definition necessary to effect the suggestion must be
inclusive. Section 2's present definition of corporate citizenship is exclusionary because functionally it defines eligibility for certain benefitsfor example, subsidies, protected carriage in the domestic trade, and
vessel purchase rights. Mandatory documentation would require an inclusive definition, the primary functional thrust of which would be to define
appropriate subjects for American regulation. In the case of the present
definition, the only parties likely to dispute whether corporate citizenship
has been established are likely to be the United States government, on
one hand, and a private citizen, either corporate or individual, American
or alien, on the other.' In contrast, an inclusive definition geared toward
mandatory documentation might bring the United States into dispute with
foreign governments as well as private citizens since a foreign government might have also defined its citizens to include the particular business
enterprise. Moreover, the extent to which vessels owned directly or
indirectly by United States citizens are documented under foreign law
indicates that the marketplace has already defined American regulation to
189. The possible practical problems with this course are suggested at note 112 supra and
accompanying text.
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be a burden. Perhaps only experience could tell, but I suspect that
subterfuges to evade that burden would almost inevitably exceed the
artifices that have been used to procure the benefits of citizenship. For
example, if as now the definition of corporate citizenship included the
factor of management citizenship, United States citizenship could be
easily avoided by electing aliens to be the directors, officers, or other
relevant managers. Thus, in contrast to the paucity of cases concerning
section 2 of the Shipping Act, an inclusive definition might well produce
numerous controversies that would test and possibly distort its margins.
In addition to the definitional and enforcement problems, one can argue
that mandatory documentation would harm the United States because it
would force United States citizens to depart from operating on a lowest
cost basis. If we sought to redice that cost by amending the Merchant
Seamen Act to allow greater employment of foreign labor, we would be
counteracting the policy of protecting the jobs of United States merchant
seamen. Although that may be desirable in the abstract, it is hardly
politically feasible.
Mandatory inclusion would at least differ from a restriction on American investment abroad or foreign investment in the United States because
the requirement would apply to United States citizens engaged in the
United States foreign trade. The definitional problem, although great, has
been reduced to manageable proportions in similar burden-imposing contexts such as tax law. Inter-jurisdictional disputes-might be rare because
the vessel operator could seemingly satisfy two sets of safety regulations
by complying with the more stringent. In light of present United States
interests, that burden should hardly cause sympathetic concern. And the
problem with the lowest cost argument is that it applies to almost all
economic regulation, from minimum wages to taxes. Any economic regulation weakens the competitive position of United States producers or
suppliers in relation to a foreign enterprise whose operations are not
covered by similar laws. Regardless of the merits of the economic argument, moreover, it should be realized that the argument brings us full
circle-the United States needs in terms of world commerce now serve to
justify exclusion from rather than inclusion in the merchant marine.
CONCLUSION
The maritime restraints imposed by United States law have their historical antecedents. England, Greece, Rome, Venice, and others all attempted to restrain foreign competition.190 The report of the Board of Trade to
the Venetian Senate in 1610 merits quotation:
190. Johannes Hasebroek, an historian of ancient Greece, reports that "a Greek city did
not normally permit a foreigner to set foot upon its territory or to sail its seas-unless it
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The board of trade is called upon to give its opinion on the proposal
submitted by Paulo Santorin for the repeal of the law forbidding any but
Venetian citizens to trade from this port to the Levant.
The advantages would be the opening of new firms in the Levant, and
the introduction of fresh business into Venice. Such a scheme would in
earlier times have carried no weight, but in the present state of affairs it
appears to us that it should be adopted . .

.

.The fact that the Levant

trade was reserved for Venetian citizens shows that that trade was considered to belong absolutely to Venice, and that there was no foreign
competition. The government reserved for their own citizens the right to
trade, and not for all of them, but only for the privileged class. This
restriction, however, had the effect of keeping much capital out of the
trade, and therefore injured the revenue. Nevertheless, had the trade
continued as it was, the present'proposal might have been laid aside. But
the trade has passed into the hands of foreigners. [sic] and foreign ships
now sail straight to and from the Levant without touching Venice, preferring to trade with free ports, where they are favoured by the government. 191
urgently needed his services." J. HASEBROEK, TRADE AND POLITICS IN ANCIENT GREECE 119
(1965). Early Roman history differed from the Greek experience, but, by the end of the third
century, Rome also had adopted a restrictive attitude toward aliens. A. LEWIS, THE NORTHERN SEAS: SHIPPING AND COMMERCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE, A.D. 300-1100, at 3-39 (1958).
During the last years of the fourth century, Emperor Honorius barred all merchants residing
in the eastern portion of the empire from all ports of the western empire. Id. at 40, citing
Code Theod., VII, 16, I. Other laws even prohibited the export of plans for the construction
of ships to foreigners. A. LEWIS, supra at 41, citing Code Theod., IX, 40, 24. Venetian
experience accords with the earlier restraints imposed by the Greeks and Romans. The
Statuti Nautici, promulgated in the 13th century to govern the merchant service, attempted
to insure that Venice would remain the dominant trading sovereign in the West. Among
other things, the Statuti Nautici prohibited shipping on foreign vessels, placing insurance on
goods carried in foreign vessels, and selling vessels to foreigners. I.H. BROWN, STUDIES IN
THE HISTORY OF VENICE 347-49 (1907). Similarly, in the 15th century, the Hanseatic Council
of the League issued numerous decrees designed to maintain northern waters as a "Hanseatic preserve." C. FAYLE, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD'S SHIPPING INDUSTRY 98

(1933).
The immediate precedents for colonial and later United States legislation were the acts
commonly referred to as the English Navigation Acts, statutes promulgated in 1651 during
the Cromwellian Era (Navigation Act of 1651, The Commonwealth, reprintedin H. HUNTER, How ENGLAND GOT ITS MERCHANT MARINE 138-42 (1935)) and in 1660 by Charles II (Act
of 1660, 12 Car. 2 c. 18, reprintedin H. HUNTER, supra at 177-89). The Charta Maritima,
which resulted in the reign of British seapower, was based on six principles: (1)
bulky items
could be imported only in British vessels; (2) the products of Asia, Africa and America could
be imported only in British vessels or vessels of the country of production; (3) foreign
shipping was prohibited from trade within the entire British empire; (4) foreign vessels could
not transport merchandise from one British colony to another; (5) no imports could be
brought into British possessions by foreign vessels other than those of the country in which
the imports were produced and then only if three-quarters of the crew were citizens of that
country; and (6) the only vessels registered under the British flag were those built in the
British dominions, owned and officered by British subjects and manned by a crew of at least
three-quarters British subjects. W. BATES, AMERICAN MARINE, THE SHIPPING QUESTION IN
HISTORY AND POLITICS 57-8 (1892).
191. Archivio di Stato, July 5, 1610, reprinted in H. BROWN, supra note 190, at 358-59.
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Restrictive legislation, continued without reassessment, tends to destroy its objectives. Review of the maritime restraints must deal with the
fact that although the need for a United States merchant marine continues, the reasons for that need have changed dramatically from the
1920's. The change in interests which the merchant marine serves militates, in the minimum, toward removing the restraints on foreign investment in United States carriers involved in the domestic trade. As I have
suggested in this Article, this reassessment might lead elsewhere. Full
reassessment would also confront the inverse situation-United States
citizens who engage in the United States foreign trade with vessels
bearing foreign flags. A number of other regulated industries are faced
with similar restraints on foreign investment;1" for instance, the restrictions on foreign investment in United States air transportation are based
on the maritime restraints. 193 A reexamination of the maritime restraints
might prompt reassessment of the continued necessity for restrictions on
foreign investment in these regulated industries as well. Finally, the origin
of all of these restraints reflects a perception, right or wrong, of problems
the United States would face were foreign investment permitted above
certain levels in certain industries in the aftermath of World War 1.194
Failure to grasp the present irrelevance of the restraints is indicative of
our avoidance to date of the fundamental issue of what interests are
adversely affected in the 1970's by foreign investment. For those who are
not mesmerized by economic efficiency as the exclusive determinant of
national policy, facing that issue could be rather sobering. 195
192. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1970) (air commerce); 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 310 (1970) (communications).

193. See Phillips, Legal Restraintson ForeignDirectInvestment in the United States, 7
app. K
(1976) at K65.
194. Id. at K246.
195. See generally Phillips, supra note 1.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,

